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„I think I am, therefore, I am. I think.“
from George Carlin
„Getting an education was a bit like a communicable sexual disease. It made you
unsuitable for a lot of jobs and then you had the urge to pass it on.“
from Terry Pratchett’s Hogfather
„And once the storm is over, you won’t remember how you made it through, how you
managed to survive. You won’t even be sure, whether the storm is really over. But one
thing is certain. When you come out of the storm, you won’t be the same person who
walked in. That’s what this storm’s all about.“
from Haruki Murakami’s Kafka on the Shore
„Fact may not be truth, and truth may not be factual.“
from Haruki Murakami’s The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle
„They were all in their early thirties. An age at which it is sometimes hard to admit that
what you are living is your life.“
from Alice Munro’s The Moons of Jupiter
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Abstract
This work investigates a mid-sized break loss of coolant accident (MBLOCA) with
a 200 cm2 leak in the hot leg next to the pressurizer surge line in the most common
reactor type which is the 1, 300MWel KONVOI class pressurized water reactor (PWR).
The scope was to analyze different reflooding scenarios, where the reactor core has
already started melting when the reflooding is initiated.
For this scenario a basic simulation called „BaseCase“ is conducted to get an overview
of the accident progression and all the phenomena that occur. It also serves as a basis
for all the following studies. In the MBLOCA scenario all active emergency core cooling
systems are supposed to work correctly until the flooding pool is empty. Regularly,
a switch to sump circulation would take place at that time, but in the simulation it
is assumed to fail. So from then on no more water injection into the primary system
takes place, which will eventually lead to complete core destruction.
In order to investigate whether stable and coolable core conditions can be reached by
feeding water into the primary loops during core melting, a diverse set of reflooding
scenarios were selected to be simulated based the findings of the BaseCase simulation
The feeding can be realized by turning on the high or low pressure injection pumps
(HPI / LPI) in sump circulation mode for example, and it can take place at different lo-
cations. This leads to different reflooding scenarios, which are analyzed for differences
and cooling potential.
From study A „Variation of the beginning of reflooding“ , it could be conducted that
at least up to 40 t of melt can be cooled in the core, if the reflooding system has a
sufficient injection rate. The results of study B „Variation of the reflooding system“
show that the reflooding via the LPI creates a self-blocking effect, which compromises
the injection, thus preventing the core quenching for a time. This effect does not occur
while using the HPI, leading to the question whether a middle pressure injection (MPI)
system might be the optimum for the reflooding of a partially degraded PWR core,
since it combines a higher mass flow rate than the HPI with a higher pressure head
than the LPI.
The injection location varied in study C „Variation of the reflooding location“ does
affect the simulations, but to a much lower extend than the used reflooding system.
Nevertheless, a combined reflooding using both the hot and the cold legs seems to be
the optimum. Study D „Variation of the number of available pumps“ revealed that at
least two LPI pumps are necessary to perform a successful quenching of the core area.
The simulation with only one pump did end with a core status that seems to be stable
as well, but even after a simulation time twice as high as usual, the core could not be
flooded with water and has to be cooled by steam.
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Kurzfassung
Diese Arbeit untersucht einen Kühlmittelverluststörfall mit einem mittleren Leck
des Querschnitts 200cm2 im heißen Strang neben der Druckhalterzuleitung in ei-
nem 1.300MWel Druckwasserreaktor vom Typ KONVOI. Das Ziel war es, verschiedene
Flutszenarien zu analysieren, bei denen der Reaktorkern bereits begonnen hat zu
schmelzen wenn das Fluten initiiert wird.
Es wurde zuerst ein Basisfall simuliert, um einen Überblick über den Unfallverlauf und
die auftretenden Phänomene zu erhalten. Er diente als Grundlage für alle folgenden
Studien. Im Fall des mittleren Lecks wurde angenommen, dass alle aktiven Wasser-
einspeisesysteme regulär funktionieren bis das Flutbecken leer ist. An dieser Stelle
müsste ein Umschalten auf Sumpfbetrieb stattfinden, von dem für dieses Szenario
angenommen wurde, dass es fehlschlägt und unbemerkt bleibt. Von diesem Zeitpunkt
an wird also kein Wasser mehr in das Primärsystem eingespeist, sodass im Endeffekt
das gesamte Kerninventar zerstört wird.
Auf der Grundlage des Basisfalls wurden Szenarien simuliert, in denen das Primärsys-
tem während des Abschmelzvorgangs im Kern mit Wasser geflutet wird. Dabei sollte
eine Antwort auf die Frage gefunden werden, ob sich so eine stabile, kühlbare Kern-
konfiguration einstellen lässt. Der Flutvorgang kann initiiert werden, indem entweder
die Hoch- oder die Niederdruckpumpen im Sumpfbetrieb eingeschaltet werden, und
es kann in verschiedene Stellen der vier Stränge eingespeist werden. Daraus ergaben
sich verschiedene Flutszenarien, die auf Unterschiede und Kühlpotential analysiert
wurden.
Aus Studie A „Variation des Zeitpunkts zu dem das Fluten gestartet wird“ hat sich
ergeben, dass zumindest 40 t Schmelze im Kernbereich gekühlt werden können, wenn
das zum Fluten verwendete Einspeisesystem eine ausreichende Einspeiserate aufweist.
Die Ergebnisse von Studie B „Variation des Pumpensystems“ zeigen, dass das Fluten
mit dem Niederdruckeinspeisesystem zu einem Selbstblockadeeffekt führt, der eine
weitere Einspeisung und damit ein schnelles Fluten des Kerns verhindert. Dieser Effekt
tritt nicht auf, wenn das Hochdruckeinspeisesystem verwendet wird, was die Frage
aufwirft, ob nicht ein Mitteldruckeinspeisesystem optimal wäre, da es eine höhere
Einspeiserate als das Hochdruckeinspeisesystem mit einem höheren Förderdruck als
das Niederdruckeinspeisesystem kombiniert.
Die Einspeisestelle, die in Studie C „Variation des Einspeiseorts“ variiert wurde, beein-
flusst die Simulation zwar, aber zu einem deutlich niedrigeren Grad als das verwende-
te Einspeisesystem. Eine kombinierte Einspeisung in die kalten und heißen Stränge
scheint hier das Optimum zu sein. In Studie D „Variation der Anzahl an verfügbaren
Pumpen“ hat sich gezeigt, dass mindestens zwei Pumpen notwendig sind, um den
VII
Kern erfolgreich zu quenchen. Die Simulation mit nur einer Pumpe ergab zwar eben-
falls einen Kernstatus, der stabil erschien, jedoch konnte der Druckbehälter selbst in
der zweifachen Simulationszeit nicht geflutet werden, sodass die Wärme im oberen
Kernbereich weiterhin nur durch Dampfkühlung abgeführt werden konnte.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Since the worlds electricity demand is steadily increasing due to rising population and
the high consumption of electricity by the lifestyle of foremost industrialized western
nations, the need for clean and sustainable energy has never been more pressing
than now. Nuclear technology has given the world the most efficient and clean energy
source while at the same time being comparatively cheap and environmentally friendly.
Most of the world’s highly industrialized nations use nuclear power in combination
with fossil energy sources like gas, oil and coal as well as renewable energy supplies
like wind, water and sun, to reliably supply their industry and private households
around the clock with affordable electricity.
In spring of 2011 the world witnessed one of the most devastating accidents in a
nuclear facility in history, following the heaviest earthquake and highest Tsunami
ever recorded in Japan [5]. The To¯hoku earthquake with its magnitude of 9.0/MW or
8.4/Mjma occurred not far from the Sanriku coast of Japan, and only about 130 km from
the metropolis of Sendai. It led to massive destruction of vast regions of the Miyagi
prefecture and thousands of deaths, and was also the trigger of a massive Tsunami,
which hit the coast only 50 minutes after the earthquake started [6].
Though not nearest to the epicenter, the power plants at the Fukushima Daiichi plant
site had the most trouble in dealing with the earthquake and following Tsunami.
The earthquake was of a very high magnitude, but did not damage the power plant
too much, so the emergency reactor shutdown was initiated automatically. Due to
the earthquake, all off-site power supply had been lost and the emergency diesel
generators were started according to emergency protocol and supplied the safety
systems and functions of all six plants. The flooding of the plant site by the Tsunami
then had two major impacts on the nuclear reactors. First, the basements containing
the diesel generators were flooded, and thus all but one generator (which supplied
units 5 and 6 successfully) failed and emergency power supply was lost in units 1 to
4, leading to a station blackout (SBO) condition. Second, the ultimate heat sink (in
this case the ocean) was lost when the sea water pumps were flooded, leading to a
delayed shut-down of the existing passive core cooling functions. There were implied
accident mitigation actions like water injection into the reactor through fire engines,
but they were not successful and in the end reactors 1 to 3 experienced a nuclear
core meltdown with hydrogen release to the containment, which led to hydrogen
explosions in the reactor buildings [7].
The nuclear industry is expanding worldwide and many countries are currently not
only planning and building new facilities but operating older fleets of nuclear power
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plants as well. The accident in Fukushima renewed the world’s public awareness of
nuclear hazards, and lead to high safety requirements for new nuclear facilities as well
as the so called „stress tests“ , which were performed for many existing nuclear power
plants in order to assess their capability to deal with beyond design basis accidents. As
a result, the authorities demand to make existing facilities safer by retrofitting new and
mainly passive cooling systems into them. The existing GEN II reactors already include
safety and emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) like the passive accumulators or
active water injection systems. But many of these systems rely on AC or DC power
supply in order to work properly, and Fukushima revealed that the risk of a total SBO
in combination with a simultaneous loss of ultimate heat sink is quite real. Also it
brought to mind that - since nuclear power plants are very safe in comparison to other
industrial facilities - due to the complexity, there are still uncertainties in the modeling
and simulation of reactor accidents with core melting.
Those so called beyond design basis accidents (BDBA) - even though they are very
unlikely to ever happen - have the potential to completely destroy a nuclear facility and
put the health of on-site personal and even civilians at risk, if no counter-measures
are taken. This is why along with new generations of power plants, new and adapted
safety systems and procedures have to be developed for existing reactor types, in order
to keep nuclear power plants safe and technologically up to date.
In order to develop and assess accurate measures to counteract a potential core
meltdown, we need to know as much details as possible about those beyond design
basis conditions and what exactly the melting core looks like. Since experiments with
nuclear fuel are complicated and dangerous, research in the BDBA area is forced to
strongly use simulation tools like MELCOR (Methods for Estimation of Leaks and
Consequences of Releases) [8–10], ASTEC (Accident Source Term Evaluation Code)
[11] and ATHLET-CD (Analysis of THermalhydraulics of LEaks and Transients - Core
Degradation). So in recent years, these tools were enabled to simulate core melting
accidents and cover the whole sequence of an accident, from full-load operation over
water loss and core melting, to hydrogen production and source term evaluation.
The main strategy to stop a core melting accident already in progress is to flood the
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) with water as soon as possible, given that the RPV is still
intact. As long as the core area is covered by water, the generated heat can be removed
either by convective heat transfer or through evaporation. Also, the water filters the
fission products and protects the surroundings from radiation.
On the other hand, the flooding of a melting core can lead to adverse effects like
risk of explosion due to enhanced hydrogen production or embrittlement of the core
material and the formation of debris. All those phenomena can have an effect on the
evolution of the core melting accident, thus changing the chances of terminating the
accident.
Even though Germany has decided its nuclear phase-out in the aftermath of Fukushima,
there is still a lot of work left to do in the nuclear sector of the country. This does not
only cover the years of operation left, but also decommissioning of the old nuclear
facilities as well as waste treatment. Since Germany has many decades of experience
with nuclear power plants, the country’s experts will continue to contribute to the
progress in nuclear technology by doing relevant research in different scientific topics.
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In order to keep its expertise and competence, the government is funding research
projects, in which a number of research institutes and universities come together to
work on pressing safety matters in the field.
This thesis is embedded in the German joint research project WASA-BOSS (Weiteren-
twicklung und Anwendung von Severe Accident Codes - Bewertung und Optimierung
von Störfallmaßnahmen), which started in 2013. Its goal is to simulate certain severe
accidents in German pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors
(BWRs), and to develop and assess the influence of severe accident measures on
the accident progression, in order to provide a basis for severe accident mitigation
guidelines (SAMGs) for these power plants.
1.2 State of the art
1.2.1 The KONVOI type pressurized water reactor
Figure 1.1: Schematic of a KONVOI type pressure water reactors primary system [1]
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The standard KONVOI type pressure water reactor consists of two separate water /
steam cycles called the primary and secondary system. The primary system contains
the reactor pressure vessel housing the reactor core and four water loops, each leading
hot water from the core through the hot leg to a steam generator and through the
main coolant pump in the cold leg back into the core. This configuration can be seen
in figure 1.1, where the RPV is shown as well as the four identical loops. There is
only one major difference between one of the loops and the other three, which is the
connection of the pressurizer surge line to one of the cold legs. The surge line leads
to the pressurizer, which regulates the pressure of the primary system and serves as
compensation tank for small changes of the water inventory as well. The pressurizer
is connected to a pressurizer relief tank, which serves as a collecting vessel, in which
steam from the primary loop can be condensed in case of over-pressurization.
The steam generator serves as a heat exchanger between the primary and secondary
circuit. The hot water coming from the core flows through more than 4,000 small
U-tubes, giving off its heat through the metal walls to the water on the secondary side
of the steam generator. Since the pressure in the secondary system is only around
7 MPa, the water on the secondary side will evaporate and the resulting steam is
guided onto the turbine. From there, the steam is guided into condensers, and from
there the water flows back into the steam generator secondary sides.
Figure 1.2: Schematic of a reactor pressure vessel of a KONVOI type pressure water
reactor [1]
The reactor pressure vessel is the heart of every nuclear power plant. A typical con-
struction is shown in figure 1.2, with one exemplary inlet and outlet connection not
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showing the other six, which surround the RPV. Positioned in the lower half of the RPV
is the fuel element rack holding nearly 200 fuel elements, while the upper space of the
RPV is mainly used for the control rod structures. The area below the fuel element rack
is called lower plenum, while the space above the control elements is called upper
head.
1.2.2 Emergency core cooling systems in the design of a KONVOI
type pressure water reactor
A typical KONVOI type PWR features four methods of injecting water into the primary
system during a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA), which are part of the design basis
(see fig. 1.3):
1. The high pressure injection system (HPI) shown in red,
2. the passive accumulator injection (ACCU) shown in orange,
3. the low pressure injection system (LPI) shown in green and
4. the sump circulation mode shown in blue.
Figure 1.3: Schematic of the different emergency core cooling systems in a KONVOI
type pressure water reactor [2]
The four pumps of the high pressure injection system (red) feed water from the flood-
ing tanks into the four hot legs of the primary system with a maximum injection rate
of 77 kg/s per pump and a pressure head of 11MPa. It is possible for the operator to
switch the injection location to the cold legs if necessary.
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There are eight passive accumulators (orange) present, one connected to each leg.
Each accumulator contains 45m3 of water and is separated from the primary circuit by
a check valve, which opens below a pressure of 2.6MPa in the primary circuit. Usually,
not the whole water inventory is emptied into the primary circuit, because nitrogen
is used as a topper to keep the pressure inside the accumulators and the nitrogen is
not supposed to reach the primary circuit. For this reason, there is an implemented
„accumulator level low“ signal, stopping the injection before nitrogen can be injected
into the primary circuit.
Figure 1.4: Schematic of the volume control system in a KONVOI type pressure water
reactor [2]
The four pumps of the low pressure injection system (green) feed water from the
flooding tanks into the eight legs of the primary system with a maximum injection
rate of 325 kg/s/ per pump and a pressure head of 1.07MPa. The system is designed
to be switchable between pure hot or cold leg injection and a parallel injection into
both legs with a 50 % flow rate per leg.
The sump circulation mode (blue) is designed for a continued core cooling operation
after a loss-of-coolant accident. In case of a leak in the primary systems piping, a
lot of water will leave the primary system, partially evaporate and condensate on the
containment walls. In the end, the water will flow down into the reactor cavity called
„sump“ and accumulate there. As soon as the fresh water supply from the flooding
tanks is drained, the sump circulation mode is activated, sucking the water from the
sump, cooling and cleaning it and feeding it back into the primary system through
both the hot and the cold legs. Since the core is releasing heat continuously, the sump
circulation will become ineffective over time, but it will create a grace period during
which an external water supply can be established.
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There is another systems directly connected to the primary system, which is usually
not used in case of an accident: the volume control system (VCS). The volume control
system regulates the water inventory of the primary system and hosts a lot of other
systems, which preserve the water quality and purity, extract gases from the water,
regulate the level of boric acid and more.
The schematic of the volume control system can be seen in figure 1.4. It takes water
from the residual heat removal system, and feeds water directly into the four cold legs
ob the primary system. Each feed line contains a pump with a maximum injection rate
of 35 kg/s. The maximum pressure head has to be at least 17MPa, since the system
working during the reactors operation when the primary pressure is 16.7MPa.
Figure 1.5: Schematic of the extra borating system in a KONVOI type pressure water
reactor [2]
Another system connected to the primary system is the extra borating system (EBS).
Its main purposes are the regulation of the content of boric acid in the primary system
as well as the safe shut-down of the reactor in case the control rod system in not
operation. The EBS can poison the reactor with boric acid, which will act as a neutron
poison and stop the chain reaction. Its schematic is shown in figure 1.5.
1.2.3 The German Risk Study, Phase B
In the 1981, the German Risk Study, Phase B [12], was started in order to analyze and
investigate accident sequences in German nuclear power plants (using Biblis B as a
reference plant) and the resulting risks in a more detailed manner than during Phase A,
the results of which had been published in 1979. With the German Risk Study, Phase A,
an extensive risk analysis had been performed for the first time in the Federal Republic
of Germany, using mainly the assumptions and methods of the WASH-1400 [13] study.
The Phase A study focused on the potential risk of a nuclear power plant on the public
health, and the comparison of this risk to other civil or natural risks. The results of
Phase A led to a variety of safety enhancements in the German nuclear power plants
and showed to potential of risk studies in general. Phase B then focused on the subject
of accident behavior, analyzing the development of accident sequences, the resulting
loads on the power plant and the performance of the ECCS.
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The results of Phase B show the importance of accident management measures, be-
cause it revealed additional safety provisions, even when the implemented safety
systems do not intervene as planned and the design basis is exceeded. Those safety
provisions can be used for plant internal emergency measures in order to reduce the
risk resulting from the accident. This might be the mastery of the accident or - if this
is not possible - at least the reduction of the damage inflicted by the accident. It was
shown in Phase B that an additional safety level can be created beyond the existing
design basis levels.
The analysis of possible damage inflicted by the accident revealed great uncertainties,
especially in the area of extreme accident events, which might be highly improbable
but would also cause an enormous release of radioactivity to the environment. The
results of Phase B were used to reconsider existing safety assessments and to refine
the safety concept of the German nuclear power plants. [12, 14]
1.2.4 Phenomenology of a core melt-down
During a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in an NPP, the fuel rods will heat up and
degrade if not water can be supplied to the primary system. The water loss through
the leak sooner or later leads to an uncovering of the core starting from the top. Due
to the decay heat, the core materials will heat up, which at first will increase the gas
pressure inside the fuel rods, leading to a ballooning effect. The core melt-down
phenomenology can be seen in figure 1.6, starting from the left.
Figure 1.6: Phenomenology of the fuel rod degradation process [3]
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At some point the fuel rod cladding will burst and melt, leaving the fuel pellets exposed.
The melting cladding material will candle down to lower and colder parts of the core,
where it freezes and forms blockades between the still intact fuel rods. The fuel pellets
start melting later, when the temperature reaches the melting point of the uranium
oxide.
Figure 1.7 shows the core degradation process as modeled in ATHLET-CD. Note that
ATHLET-CD only simulates half if each rod and mirrors the results. In the initial state
the fuel rod consists of the fuel pellets (solid UO2, shown in yellow) and the cladding
material (zirconium, shown in black). With rising temperatures, a layer of zirconium
oxide (light grey) forms on the outer surface of the cladding. This process takes place
during operation and is not specific to an accident sequence.
The ballooning of the cladding leads to a failure of the cladding, releasing eutectic
(ocher) and metallic (orange) melt, which starts to candle down the fuel rods outer
surface. When the melt reaches lower and thus colder core regions, possibly even hit-
ting water, metallic crusts (brown) are formed between the rods, which will eventually
block the path for water and steam. Rising temperatures eventually lead to the melting
of the fuel pellets, releasing ceramic melt (red), which can form ceramic crusts (dark
red) in lower core regions as well.
Figure 1.7: Schematic representation of the fuel rod degradation process as simulated
by ATHLET-CD [3]
The time scale for a core melt-down is subject to uncertainties, especially depending
on the size of the leak and the amount of water injected into the primary system e.g. by
passive accumulators or other ECCS. Exemplarily, the accident in TMI-2 in 1979 can
be used as a reference. This accident is commonly divided into seven phases [15–17]:
Phase 1: LOCA (duration ca. 100min)
Phase 2: Core heating without available RCS or ECCS (duration ca. 74min)
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Phase 3: Partial core reflooding and formation of a debris bed (duration ca. 6min)
Phase 4: Formation of a molten pool inside the debris bed (duration ca. 20min)
Phase 5: Total core reflooding (duration ca. 24min)
Phase 6: Relocation of core material to the lower plenum (duration ca. 2min)
Phase 7: Establishment of steady cooling conditions
The accident serves as the only core meltdown of reactor scale, because all experiments
performed since had smaller geometries. This is the reason, why all severe accident
codes have to be tested in the simulation of the TMI-2 accident, in order to asses
effects caused by the 3D geometry of the reactor and scale effects that might not
appear in smaller experiments [16, 17]. The TMI-2 accident is of great value to this
work, because the reactor not only went through the full core degradation process,
but also experienced a reflooding during the degradation, which in this case led to a
coolable condition inside the RPV, even though not all the fuel could be retained in the
core area. The incident proved that a core meltdown can be stopped under specific
conditions and serves as a basis for all the reflooding variations discussed in this work.
Nevertheless it cannot be compared directly, because the core degradation took place
under high pressure conditions because of the small leak size, while the pressure in
case of an MBLOCA decreases rapidly to a level below 1MPa.
1.2.5 The Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (SAMGs)
All the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) implemented in nuclear power plants
have the goal to keep the core integrity and supply a heat sink for the decay heat
in order to prevent radioactive releases from the power plant to the environment.
However, due to unforeseen events, operator errors or a combination of events, severe
accidents with damage to the core are possible.
For this reason, severe accident mitigation guidelines have been developed. They no
longer have the goal to keep the core intact, but assume that core integrity has been
lost already. Thus they focus on preventing / minimizing the radioactive releases to
the environment and the supply of a heat sink in order to cool the degrading core as
fast and reliable as possible.
There are different techniques applied in Severe Accident Management Guidelines,
which can be categorizes into three categories: [18, 19]
Measures applied to keep the integrity of the barriers „Reactor Pressure Vessel“
and „Reactor Cooling System“
In order to keep the integrity of the RPV and / or RCS, it is of highest importance to
cool the degrading core while keeping the pressure low enough so the RPV and RCS do
not fail due to overpressure. Mitigation strategies can include the injection of water
into the RPV and RCS, for example using the ECCS or systems like the VCS and EBS, or
a spray system, which is implemented into the RCS of boiling water reactors. In case
of a PWR, the restart of one or more reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) can enhance the
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water flow into the RPV by establishing a forced water convection cycle. The supply of
water to the core reduces the heat inventory and thus the systems pressure. Another
strategy to reduce the pressure can be the opening of safety valves, which would lead
to a controlled release into the pressure relief tank (PWR) or condensation pool (BWR).
To remove the heat from the core, it is important to keep the steam generators working,
which is why water has to be supplied to the steam generators in parallel, too. A
depressurization of the steam generators can be necessary as well, especially when
the pressure of the primary system is reduced.
Another mitigation measure - depending on the reactor configuration - can be the
external cooling of the RPV. This would remove heat through the RPV wall and could
possibly prevent a creep failure of the RPV.
Measures applied to keep the containment integrity
In order to keep the integrity of the containment barrier, measures might have to be
taken, which deal with the dangers induced by hydrogen deflagration or detonation.
These measured include the operation of hydrogen recombiners or igniters, which
shall lead to a controlled burning of the hydrogen inside the containment before the
risk of a hydrogen detonation can arise. Since not only hydrogen but also oxygen is
necessary to be present for a deflagration or detonation reaction, the inerting of the
containment atmosphere using non-condensable gases or possibly steam is an option
as well.
Venting of the containment by using the filtered venting system might have to be done
in order to reduce the risk of a catastrophic containment failure due to overpressure.
This would lead to a source term to the environment, but is would be a rather small
one and could be released in a controlled manner over a certain time, thus preventing
higher contamination. Also, the filtered venting system would reduce the amount of
radioactivity released, as long as the systems maximum capacity is not exceeded. A
filtered venting system is installed in all German nuclear power plants.
New built nuclear power plants also include passive containment cooling systems, re-
leasing huge amounts of water to the outside of the steal liner in order to both dissipate
the heat from the containment and reduce the pressure. Another passive containment
cooling concept is the operation of building condensers, which would replace the
steam generators as the primary heat sink under severe accident conditions.
Measures to minimize the radioactive releases
If radioactive releases have taken place into the reactor building or even into the
surrounding buildings, measures have to be taken to minimize the release to the
environment. These measures can include the spraying or even flooding of the reactor
building or the spent fuel pool, depending strongly on the availability of appropriate
systems and water. A venting of the affected buildings might be inevitable if the pres-
sure rises and a failure due to overpressure cannot be ruled out. Another measure
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might be the spraying of the containment in order to wash out released fission prod-
ucts and thus reduce the radioactive releases through the containment building or
auxiliary buildings.
In-vessel and ex-vessel corium melt retention concepts
In reactors of newer generations, in-vessel and ex-vessel melt retention strategies have
been implemented in order to retain the core melt inside the containment building
in case of a severe accident with core melting. The in-vessel melt retention mainly
focuses on cooling the melt and RPV while the melt is still inside it, thus preventing
the RPV failure and melt release to the containment. The ex-vessel melt retention
strategies all come down to some kind of core catcher, which is located below the RPV
and shall spread the corium over a certain area in order to enlarge its surface. The
corium is then cooled by water, sometimes from the top, sometimes from nozzles in
the core catcher below. In most concepts, sacrificial concrete is provided and shall
condition the corium melt to become less viscous and reduce the temperature of the
mixture as well.
1.3 Objective of this work
The severe accident mitigation is one of the major research fields in the community
of nuclear energy, and has even gained attention and funding since the accident
in Fukushima in 2011. SAMGs have been implemented in many countries of the
world, but there remain large uncertainties concerning core degradation sequences.
This is mainly due to the fact that there have not been many reactor accidents with
core-meltdown, luckily. Experiments with nuclear fuel are expensive and potentially
dangerous and can never be at reactor scale, making interpolation processes rather
uncertain. This is why the simulation of severe accidents has gained increasing impor-
tance for the provision of knowledge on core degradation sequences, which in turn
is essential for the development of SAMGs and other systems to create safer power
plants for the future.
Against this background, the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research
has funded the WASA-BOSS project, which brought together the top German nuclear
research facilities in order to exchange and extend the knowledge on severe accidents
and to assess the implemented SAGMs in Germany.
As part of the project, the IKE investigated a core degradation scenario using the Ger-
man severe accident code system ATHLET-CD. The goal of this work was to simulate
reflooding of the degrading core in order to assess the effectiveness of the reflooding
using the ECCS and to propose potential optimizations to the SAMGs.
The first part of this work deals with the question, where the coolability limits are and
up to which amount of molten core material a stable and coolable condition can be
reached by reflooding the RPV. In this context, the way to judge coolability is assessed
as well, because different criteria are possible. The question whether a middle pressure
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injection system might be more effective than the standard high and low pressure
injection systems will be investigated, as well as a variety of system configuration,
which differ in the injection location and the number of available pumps.
The results are supposed to be used for the optimization of the current state of SAMGs
as well as for the design of now generations of nuclear power plants, in order to create
more effective safety measures. A critical assessment of the results will contribute to
the current state of modeling severe accidents with the system code ATHLET-CD and
highlight improvement possibilities.
This means specifically that an assessment of the chances to successfully cool a de-
grading PWR core is performed, and an extensive parametric study shall enable a
comparison of the different reflooding approaches. According to Hering et al. [20],
reflooding performed in experiments or simulated, has mainly been performed with
water mass injection rates> 1 g
s·rod (57.9 kg/s, assuming 57, 900 fuel rods for a full sized
PWR core), which is why simulations with lower injection rates have been performed
for this work as well.
From the simulations performed for this work, a recommendation is derived as to
which strategy might be preferable in the course of a severe accident similar to the one
simulated here. Another point of interest is the evaluation of possible risks arising due
to the water injection into the degrading reactor core, such as hydrogen production,
which is part of the discussion.
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For the simulations presented in this thesis, the German Severe Accident Code ATHLET-
CD was used. This code system is developed by GRS. The Institute of Nuclear Tech-
nology and Energy Systems (IKE) at the University of Stuttgart contributes to the
development of ATHLET-CD especially through models for the late phase of core
degradation.
Figure 2.1: Overview of the modular code architecture of the ATHLET code system [3]
The thermal-hydraulic system code ATHLET-CD is designed to simulate the thermal-
hydraulics of light water reactors, including DBAs and BDBAs. The highly modular
code contains different optional and non-optional modules, so that the user can op-
timize the simulation tool for its particular purpose. Figure 2.1 shows a schematic
of the ATHLET code system’s architecture. The basic module of the code system is
called ATHLET as well and contains the simulation models for thermo fluid dynamics,
heat conduction and transfer, neutronics and reactor controls. The module ECORE
is responsible for the simulation of the behavior of core materials. The common
combination of the modules ATHLET and ECORE is called ATHLET-CD and was used
for the purpose of this work, namely version 3.0A.
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For the simulation of core melting accidents, the module AIDA plays an important
role, since it simulates the transfer of molten corium to the lower plenum of the RPV, as
well as the heat transfer to the vessel wall. The MEWA module for debris bed behavior
is currently being extended at the IKE to simulate three dimensional beds, and shall
be able to couple to the ATHLET code system soon.
In addition, there are modules available for the release and transport of fission prod-
ucts and aerosols (FIPREM and SOPHAEROS), as well as nuclide properties (OREST
and FIPISO). It is possible, to couple the ATHLET code system to the containment code
COCOSYS in order to simulate a severe accident with release to the containment until
containment failure occurs. For the simulation of 2D- or 3D-thermo fluid dynamics,
several common CFD / CFD codes can be used. For the simulation conducted in this
work, only ATHLET, ECORE and AIDA were used.
2.1 Thermo fluid dynamics (TFD)
To simulate the thermo-fluid-dynamic behavior of the coolant, the user has to spec-
ify the whole piping system with all its geometrical and fluid dynamic properties.
Therefore different kinds of objects are available, basically pipes and branches, but
special objects like a steam water separator as well. Each object can be subdivided into
numerous cells, the so-called control volumes (CVs), in order to refine the simulation’s
resolution. All objects have to be coupled via junctions, in order to provide valid flow
paths (see fig. 2.2).
Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of two thermo fluid dynamic control volumes,
connected by a junction
In principle, mass and energy conservation is based on the CVs, while the momentum
balance is based on the junctions. The user can chose between the classic 5-equation
model and a two-fluid model with separate momentum balance equations for liquid
and vapor. The two-fluid model (or six equation model) treats the liquid and vapor
phases of the coolant independently, so that for both phases the equations for mass,
energy and momentum have to be solved:
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Liquid mass:
∂ ((1− α) ρL)
∂t
+∇ ((1− α) ρL ~wL) = −Ψ (2.1)
Vapor mass:
∂ (αρV )
∂t
+∇ (αρV ~wV ) = Ψ (2.2)
Liquid energy:
∂
[
(1− α) ρL
(
hL +
1
2
~wL ~wL − pρL
)]
∂t
+∇
[
(1− α) ρL ~wL
(
hL +
1
2
~wL ~wL
)]
(2.3)
= −p ∂ (1− α)
∂t
+ ~τi ~wL shear work at the phase interface
+ (1− α)~τi (~wV − ~wL) dissipation due to interfacial shear
+ (1− α) ρL~g ~wL gravitational work
+ q˙WL heat flow through structures
+ q˙i heat flow at the phase interface
+ Ψ
(
hΨ,L +
1
2
~wΨ ~wΨ
)
energy flow due to phase change
+ SE,L external source terms
with
~wΨ = ~wL for evaporation
~wΨ = ~wV for condensation
Vapor energy:
∂
[
αρV
(
hV +
1
2
~wV ~wV − pρV
)]
∂t
+∇
[
αρV ~wV
(
hV +
1
2
~wV ~wV
)]
(2.4)
= −p ∂α
∂t
− ~τi ~wV shear work at the phase interface
+ α~τi (~wV − ~wL) dissipation due to interfacial shear
+ αρV ~g ~wV gravitational work
+ q˙WV heat flow through structures
+ q˙i heat flow at the phase interface
+ Ψ
(
hΨ,V +
1
2
~wΨ ~wΨ
)
energy flow due to phase change
+ SE,V external source terms
with
~wΨ = ~wL for evaporation
~wΨ = ~wV for condensation
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Liquid momentum:
∂ ((1− α) ρL ~wL)
∂t
+∇ ((1− α) ρL ~wL ~wL) +∇ ((1− α) p) = (2.5)
+~τi interfacial friction
− (1− α) ~fW wall friction
−Ψ~wΓ momentum flux due to phase change
− (1− α) ρL~g gravitation
+α (1− α) (ρL − ρV )~gDh∇α water level force
+α (1− α) ρm
(
δ ~wR
δt
+∇~wR
)
virtual mass
+SI,L external momentum source terms (e. g. pumps)
Vapor momentum:
∂ (αρV ~wV )
∂t
+∇ (αρV ~wV ~wV ) +∇ (αp) = (2.6)
−~τi interfacial friction
−α~fW wall friction
+Ψ~wΓ momentum flux due to phase change
−αρV ~g gravitation
−α (1− α) (ρL − ρV )~gDh∇α water level force
−α (1− α) ρm
(
δ ~wR
δt
+∇~wR
)
virtual mass
+SI,V external momentum source terms (e. g. pumps)
with
ρm = αρV + (1− α) ρL
~wR = ~wV − ~wL
The ATHLET-CD code system performs spatial integrations on the basis of a finite-
volume approach, which leads to a set of first order differential equations, also called
the 2M model: two equations per CV stemming from mass conservation, two from
energy conservation and two equations per junction for momentum conservation.
For the integration, a change in the geometry of flow channels and structures is
neglected, as well as the dissipation energy and potential energy distribution to the
energy balance equations [21].
If alternatively the five equation model (or 1M model) is applied, the momentum
equations of liquid and vapor are combined to a momentum equation for a two-phase
mixture:
∂ (ρm ~wm)
∂t
− ~wm∂ρm
∂t
+ ρm ~wm∇~wm +∇
(
α (1− α) ρV ρL
ρm
~wR ~wR
)
+∇p = (2.7)
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+~fW wall friction
+ρm~g gravitation
+SI,m external momentum source terms
where
~wm =
1
ρm
(αρV ~wV + (1− α) ρL ~wL)
In case of the five equation model, the momentum conservation equation for the
mixture is complemented by a set of empirical algebraic laws describing the slip
between the phases as a function of the void fraction and mixture velocity. This model
is called the drift-flux model and it allows for the explicit calculation of the liquid and
gas velocities [21].
There are two different kinds of CVs available in the ATHLET-CD code: the homoge-
neous CV, and one with a mixture level inside. In the homogeneous CV, liquid and
vapor, as well as non-condensable gases are evenly distributed, while the CV with
mixture level is automatically divided in two sub-CVs. The upper sub-CV contains
vapor with droplets as necessary, while the lower sub-CV contains water with bubbles
as necessary. If the mixture level approach is applied, the five equation model has to
be used for the corresponding CVs.
Independent of the chosen CV type and balance equation model, a number of impor-
tant non-condensable gases can be simulated, which are hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen,
air, helium and one user defined gas. They are basically treated as ideal gases and are
simulated to have the same temperature and velocity as the vapor.
In addition, the boron tracking model can be used to simulate the transport of boric
acid, which is dissolved in the liquid phase of the coolant only, through the system.
For the coolant not only light water is available, but also heavy water, helium and
some liquid metals. For the simulation of leakages, specific models for critical flow
and critical discharge have to be applied. For more information on the thermo fluid
dynamic properties of the ATHLET-CD simulation tool, see Austregesilo et al. [21].
2.2 Heat conduction and heat transfer (HECU)
The HECU module simulates one-dimensional heat conduction in solid materials
with up to three material zones separated by a gap. A HECU object can be coupled to a
thermo fluid dynamic CV on one or both sides, in order to allow heat transfer between
two CVs or between a CV and the environment.
∫
V
W · dV =
︸ ︷︷ ︸
rate of heat generation
cP · ρ ·
∫
V
δT
δt
· dV
︸ ︷︷ ︸
rate of change of internal energy
+
∫
S
~q · d ~A
︸ ︷︷ ︸
heat flow crossing the boundary
(2.8)
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The basic assumptions made for the heat conduction theory are that the solid material
is homogeneous and isotropic and has no dependencies on pressure. Phase changes
of the material are neglected as well. The basic equation to be solved by the HECU
module is the conservation of energy inside of the heat conduction objects (HCOs)
2.8.
Figure 2.3: Schematic representation of the energy balance in an exemplified heat
conduction layer
Figure 2.3 shows an exemplified heat conduction layer. The application of equation
(2.8) to this layer under the assumption of uniform heat generation distribution,
temperature and material properties leads to the following equation:
Qin︸︷︷︸
rate of heat flow into
layer
+ W · V︸ ︷︷ ︸
rate of heat genera-
tion in the layer
= Qout︸︷︷︸
rate of heat flow out
of the layer
+ ρ · cP · V · dT
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
rate of change of in-
ternal energy in the
layer
(2.9)
The specific equations for the heat flow into and out of the layer depend on the
geometry of the layer, which can be cylindrical, flat or spherical. HECU also handles
the heat transfer between the fluid and the solid structures.
In principle, the ATHLET-CD simulation tool divides the heat transfer into four main
regimes, which are:
Level I: Heat flow from fluid to wall
Level II: Heat flow from wall to fluid
Level III: Transition boiling
Level IV: Stable film boiling
For every regime, and several sub-regimes, different correlations for the calculation of
heat transfer coefficients are applied, while the user has a variety of options to control
the transition between nucleate boiling and film boiling. Details can be found in the
ATHLET Input Data Description [22].
Also, the HECU module separately accounts for condensation and evaporation directly
on heating or cooling surfaces and offers the option for a quench front model for both
top and bottom flooding conditions.
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2.3 Time advancement procedure (FEBE)
Through the spatial integration of the conservation equations over control volumes
and junctions, the system of spatial differential equations is transformed into a system
of coupled differential equations (see section 2.1). To determine a numerical solution
for an initial value problem of this large system of ordinary differential equations, the
ATHLET-CD code uses the FEBE-method (Forward-Euler - Backward-Euler) [21].
dy
dt
= f(y, t), with initial values y(t0) = y0 (2.10)
The solution variables yi depend only on time, and describe the temporal evolution of
the thermo-fluid-dynamic state of the system. The number of variables yi, and thus
differential equations, depends on the number of CVs and their junctions, and on the
number of solution variables in every basic element.
The ATHLET-CD code approximates the time derivatives y˙i to be only dependent
on the solutions variables of a few adjacent elements, using spatial approximation
algorithms:
dyi
dt
= fi(yi−iL , ..., yi−1, yi, yi+1, ..., yi+iR , t) (2.11)
By applying this method in the ATHLET-CD simulations, three types of methodical
errors occur:
1. Errors in the physical models. These errors have to be minimized by comparing
simulation results with experiments and by improving the models, if necessary.
2. Errors due to spatial discretisation. To minimize these errors, the discretisation
has to be refined until the differences between the results have diminished
to an acceptable level. It has to be noted that in practice this refinement is
only possible up to a limited amount of control volumes, because the finer the
discretisation becomes, the higher will be the simulation time.
3. Errors caused by the time discretisation. This kind of error is limited by the ap-
plied time advancement procedure in the integration of the differential equation
system.
The time advancement procedure in the ATHLET-CD simulations consists of two steps
[23]. In the first step the system of differential equations is solved with the linear
implicit Euler method, using a time step considerably bigger than the one supposed
to get accurate solutions. In order to control the local discretisation error produced by
this method, a second stage is applied in which another solution in calculated taking
two steps with half the time step size. From those two solutions an extrapolation of the
solution value for a time step size ∆t → 0 is performed, and the difference between
the actual and extrapolated value is compared against the given error bound. If the
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difference is of an acceptable value, the extrapolated value is taken as the solution, and
the simulation moves on to the next time step. If not, another solution is calculated
at one third of the time step. Then the extrapolation is done again with the three
available solutions, and again the result is compared against the error bound. The
FEBE method could continue this to higher orders (4th, 5th, etc.), but it stops at 3rd
order by default. If the estimated error does not satisfy the accuracy criterion by then,
the whole step is restarted, with a new basic time step reduced by at least a factor of
two. This is repeated until the time step size has become so small that it is below the
lower limitation given by the user as input value. In this case the code stops with an
error status.
2.4 General simulation control (GCSM)
To simulate the balance-of-plant systems, the general control simulation module
(GCSM) is used. It is a block-oriented language, which describes the control and
protection systems of the simulated nuclear power plant. [24] Every GCSM control
element is restricted to a maximum of four input values, and gives only one output
value.
The GCSM provides interface data to the simulation of the thermal dynamic plant
behavior by means of process signals like temperature and pressure values and control
signals or hardware actions such as valve positions. There is a total of 41 process
signals and 26 different hardware actions available, which are described in detail in
Austregesilo et al. [21].
In GCSM, a set of interconnected signals is used to simulate the whole control system
of the power plant. There are 25 basic control elements (e.g. SWITCH, ADDER, ...) and
three special control elements available, which can be coupled by the user input for
the simulation of complex systems.
2.5 Core degradation (ECORE)
ATHLET can be used together with the module HECU (see Section 2.2) to simulate the
thermal behavior of fuel and control rods adequately as long as the initial geometry
remains intact. However, when insufficient cooling leads to a heat-up of the core
beyond approximately 1100K, core degradation sets in and leads to the chemical and
melting phenomena listed in Table 2.1. In order to be able to simulate these processes
as well, ATHLET is coupled with the module ECORE. This version, which can also
be used to simulate severe accidents with core melting, is called ATHLET-CD. The
module ECORE aims at modeling of the most relevant processes in the reactor core,
up to complete failure of the core. Quite detailed models are available for the early
phase of core degradation, which is characterized by the still mostly intact rod bundle
geometry.
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Table 2.1: Phenomena important for the degradation process and their occurrence
temperatures
Temperatures Phenomenon
1100K Melting of absorber material (AIC), thus failure of the control rods
1220K Eutectic interaction of both Fe and Ni with Zr and thus interaction
of the fuel rod cladding with the spacers and possible penetration
of the cladding
1400K Formation of liquid U due to UO2/Zr interaction (insignificant)
1500K Liquefaction of inconel/Zr and thus start of rapid Zr oxidation
and cladding embrittlement
1650K Melting of inconel
1720K Melting of stainless steel
2030K Melting of zircaloy-4
2170K Formation of αZr(O)/UO2 eutectics
2245K Melting of αZr(O)
2670K Formation of αZr(O)/UO2 and U/UO2 monotectics
2750K Melting of UO2−X
2810K Formation of liquid phase of oxidic UO2 − ZrO2-eutectics
2900K Melting of UO2+X
2960K Melting of ZrO2
3120K Melting of UO2
The model approach followed in ECORE is one of representative rods, which can be
either fuel or control rods. Representative fuel rods consist of fuel pellets separated
from the cladding by a gas filled gap, while the control rods are composed of absorber
pellets enclosed in the cladding of the guide tube. The representative rods are axially
meshed in order to describe axial profiles of temperature, layer thickness, etc. Usually,
the core will be divided into several concentric rings, with one representative fuel and
one representative control rod, simulating theNfuel andNcontrol rods in this ring. Then,
each ring is typically associated to a separate thermal-hydraulic channel.
The idea of the representative rod concept is that within certain parts of the core many
rods have the same fission (or decay) power and are subject to approximately the same
thermal-hydraulic boundary conditions. Thus, it is sufficient to model the behavior
of very few rods to describe the behavior of a whole core. A further advantage of the
concept of representative rods is that the modeling can take into account effects that
occur at the rod level in a very detailed manner, like the formation of melt and its
relocation along the rod in streaks. This strength however becomes a weakness when
interactions between several rods become important, like when the melt produced
along several rods starts to merge and forms blockages or possibly a molten pool in a
later stage.
The processes modeled by the ECORE module include:
• The thermal behavior of the rods:
– radial heat conduction inside the fuel, heat transfer through the gap and
conduction through the cladding,
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– axial heat conduction in the rod,
– convective heat transfer with the surrounding fluid in single- and two-phase
regimes and
– radiative heat transfer between neighboring rods and to surrounding struc-
tures at the top, bottom and radial core boundaries.
• The cladding’s mechanical behavior: deformation and creep of the cladding
(ballooning) due to the difference between the rod’s internal pressure and the
system pressure up to possible mechanical failure (clad burst).
• Exothermic reactions between cladding and steam (cladding oxidation), leading
to formation of a ZrO2 protective layer and hydrogen.
• The formation and relocation of melt (absorber, metallic and oxidic).
Further models and modules in ATHLET-CD deal with fission product release and
transport in the primary system (modules FIPREM and SOPHAEROS) as well as with
the formation and behavior of debris beds during the late phase of core degradation
(module MEWA). Since these have not been used in the present work, they are not
discussed further here.
2.5.1 Cladding oxidation
At temperatures above ca. 900◦C the chemical reaction between the cladding material
and steam becomes significant. The oxidation of Zr by steam is described by the
formula:
Zr + 2H2O = ZrO2 + 2H2 + ∆H; ∆H ≈ 547 kJ / molZr (2.12)
This reaction is strongly exothermic and contributes significantly to the core heat-up.
Various experiments have shown that the oxidation phenomenon is essentially non
stationary and controlled by oxygen diffusion, which leads to growth of a protective
layer (ZrO2), consuming the initial cladding material during the process. The chemical
reaction kinetics can be approximated by rate laws of the form:
dX2
dt
= K (2.13)
where X is the layer thickness of the ZrO2 layer. From the growth rate of the ZrO2
layer, the amount of hydrogen as well as the reaction heat can be calculated, taking
into account the reaction equation 2.12. The temperature dependent kinetic oxida-
tion constant K is determined from experiments and usually given as an Arrhenius
formulation of the form:
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K = A · exp
(
−∆E
RT
)
, (2.14)
where T is the temperature in Kelvin, R the perfect gas constant in J/(molK), A the
rate factor and ∆E the activation energy.
The values of A and ∆E come from experimental correlations, for which ATHLET-CD
leaves the user to choose between two correlations for the low temperature range:
• The Cathcart model with a temperature range of 1273K to 1800K and
• the Leistikow model with a temperature range of 1173K to 1800K,
and two for the high temperature range:
• the Urbanic/Heidrick model with a temperature range of 1900K to 2100K and
• the Prater/Courtright model with a temperature range of 2600K to 2673K.
The Urbanic/Heidrick model can only be combined with the Cathcart model. Be-
tween the low and high temperature range, a so-called transition range is modeled by
ATHLET-CD, where the values for the low and high temperature regimes are linked by
interpolation. It should be noted that the ranges of validity given in the literature for
the above correlations cover a larger range. Furthermore, ATHLET-CD extrapolates
the correlations beyond the validity ranges given above.
From equation 2.13 and 2.14 it can be deduced that the reaction rate increases with
temperature and decreases with oxide layer thickness (i.e. with duration of the oxi-
dation process). The oxidation rate calculated by equation 2.13 can only be reached
if sufficient steam is available. However, as steam is consumed and hydrogen is pro-
duced in the reaction, the so-called „steam starvation“ condition causes the oxidation
reaction to cease. In ATHLET-CD, the reaction rate is progressively driven to zero
below a limiting steam concentration (default value of 10 %).
2.5.2 Melting and melt relocation
The modeling in ATHLET-CD distinguishes between melting processes taking place at
different temperature levels:
• Melting of absorber material, starting at 1073 K (default value for the AgInCd
absorber material).
• Formation of metallic, Zr-rich melt due to melting of cladding material and par-
tial dissolution of fuel (UO2) by diffusive and convective processes, see Hofmann
et al. [25] and Kim at al. [26]. The default value for the starting temperature of
this process (parameter TAM) is 2250K for Alpha-Zr (pre-oxidized cladding). In
case of Beta-Zr (non-oxidized cladding), a value of 2033K is recommended.
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• Formation of oxidic melt composed of UO2 and ZrO2. The default value for
the starting temperature of this process (parameter TCOMPL) is 2600K (recom-
mended for ceramic mixtures with metallic inclusions). This recommendation
results from Phébus experiments, where massive relocation of oxidic material has
been observed well below the melting temperature of the UO2 / ZrO2 eutectic.
In ATHLET-CD it is assumed that melt is generated in-situ, kept in place by an outer
oxide shell with higher melting temperature. Melt relocation is assumed to start when
this shell fails. The failure criteria combine oxide layer thickness and temperature, i.e.
failure is assumed when a certain threshold temperature is exceeded, whereby the
threshold temperature is lower for smaller layer thicknesses [27].
Melt relocation is modeled as a candling process, assuming that melt flows downwards
as rivulets along the outside of the cladding. The velocity of the melt is calculated
from a simplified momentum balance for film flow. The melt exchanges heat with the
cladding during the relocation to lower, colder locations. Re-freezing (crust formation)
occurs when the melt temperature falls below the solidification temperature, which
is by default 50 K lower than the melting temperatures TAM and TCOMPL. Crust
may re-melt later, when the temperature exceeds the melting temperature, restarting
the candling process. Details on the modeling of the candling process are given by
Kronenberg [28].
2.5.3 Effect of blockages on thermal hydraulics and melt relocation
The geometrical changes induced by the core degradation processes influence the
thermal-hydraulics as well as the interaction between rods. This includes effects like
• (partial) blocking of flow paths perpendicular and parallel to the rods due to bal-
looning or crust formation, which causes reduced cooling by the fluid (especially
during reflooding) as well as reduced availability of steam for oxidation,
• opening of preferential flow paths through voided regions created by the failure
of rods and
• melt accumulation on top of blockages (crusts), leading to sideways spreading
and finally to molten pool formation.
Such effects caused by the geometrical changes are taken into account within ATHLET-
CD only in a simplified, parametric manner. The porosity , i.e. the fraction of open
flow area to total area, is taken as an indicator variable. For intact rod geometry and
typical values of rod diameter and pitch, the porosity  is about 56 %. In the ATHLET-
CD input, several threshold values for the porosity are defined according to Table 2.2,
which also shows the recommended values.
• For  ≥ POPEN , no difference to the intact geometry is taken into account.
This means that voided regions ( → 1) are also treated like intact geometry.
• For POPEN >  ≥ PCLSR the flow perpendicular to the rods is successively
reduced to zero by increasing the drag loss coefficient for radial flow.
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• For PCLSR >  ≥ PCLSX the flow parallel to the rods is successively reduced
to zero by increasing the drag loss coefficient for axial flow. Simultaneously, the
heat transfer between rods and fluids is also driven to zero.
• For PCLSX >  ≥ PCONV the radiative heat transfer between rods is
artificially increased. It is assumed that melt rivulets coalesce and start to form
a molten pool. The increase of radiative heat exchange shall mimic the heat
transport by convection, which leads to a temperature equilibrium between
neighboring rods.
• For PCONV >  ≥ BLOCKG the relocation velocity for melt flowing into a
mesh is successively reduced to zero. Then, the porosity cannot become smaller
than BLOCKG. This prevents „overfilling“ of a mesh with melt and melt can dam
up above a blockage. However, according to the model in ECORE, melt can only
flow parallel to rods, so melt columns of different height in neighboring rods do
not lead to transverse flow, as it should be expected.
Table 2.2: Porosity boundaries used in the blockage module
Porosity Description
30 % Lower limit for open porosity (POPEN)
27 % Lower limit of porosity to limit radial flow (PCLSR)
25 % Lower limit of porosity to limit axial flow
and convective heat transfer to fluid (PCLSX)
20 % Lower limit of porosity to increase radiative heat transfer (PCONV)
10 % Lower limit of porosity to limit candling of melt (BLOCKG)
2.6 Behavior of melt in the lower plenum (AIDA)
ATHLET-CD does currently not contain models that predict the relocation of melt
(timing and path) from the core region to the lower plenum. It is up to the code user to
define a signal that initiates the transfer of melt to the lower plenum and initiates the
AIDA module. The processes occurring during melt relocation to the lower plenum
are not modeled either. The user therefore has to specify the expected configuration
of corium in the lower plenum in the input. According to the ATHLET-CD description
[27], three potential configurations are available:
1. homogeneous (oxidic) melt pool,
2. debris bed (oxidic melt pool with overlying particles) and
3. stratified melt pool (metallic melt layer on top of oxidic pool).
Option 1. is recommended and was actually the only option that worked without
numerical problems in the simulations performed in the frame of the presented work.
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The AIDA module describes the thermal behavior of melt in the lower plenum as well
as the structural response of the vessel wall. The molten pool is described using a point
model, assuming a homogeneous temperature inside the pool. Heat transfer from the
molten pool to the surrounding crust is calculated based on correlations for turbulent
natural convective heat transfer derived from experiments. These correlations give the
average Nusselt number as a function of the Rayleigh number. In the presented work,
the correlation of Mayinger et al. [29] has been applied for the heat transfer from the
melt to the upper crust and the correlation of mini-ACOPO for the heat transfer from
the melt to the lower crust in contact with the vessel.
For the heat transfer to the lower crust, the average heat flux is superposed with
a shape function depending on the polar angle, which is adapted to experimental
measurements. This yields a heat flux distribution, which is peaked at the upper edge
of the pool.
The crust thickness is calculated from a quasi-steady heat balance, taking into account
heat conduction through the crust and, optionally, heat transfer through a gap between
crust and vessel wall, which is calculated as a combination of the heat conduction of
superheated steam and thermal radiation.
For the heat transfer from the upper crust to an overlying water pool, three regimes
are distinguished: film boiling, nucleate boiling and sub-cooled boiling. For the
calculation of the temperature distribution inside the vessel wall, the transient heat
conduction equation is solved by means of a linear finite difference method in 1D or
2D. The calculated temperature development in the vessel wall is used to estimate the
creep damage and potential failure of the wall. Three different models are available in
ATHLET-CD for this. In the present work the correlation, which approximates results
from the detailed ASTOR code has been applied. Further details on the AIDA module
can be found in the GRS technical report GRS-A-2933 [30]. The input data for AIDA
used in the simulations presented in this work as well as the GCSM signals used by the
AIDA module are displayed in appendices A1 and A2.
2.7 State of the code validation
The ATHLET-CD code system is developed by GRS for many decades now, and has
constantly been improved and validated with new and extended models, developed
on the basis of advanced experiments. It is beyond the scope of this work to give a full
overview of the validation state of the ATHLET-CD code, but it shall be made clear that
especially the core degradation module ECORE has been extensively validated in the
past 20 years.
The Input Data Description for the ATHLET-CD code system [27] gives only rudimen-
tary information on the validation state of the ECORE module, but there has been
validation from GRS as well as other institutions, such as RUB-LEE and KIT. There are
papers and reports available, describing the validation of the ATHLET-CD code system
by means of the following experiments, descriptions based on Jacquemain et al. [15]
and Buck [31].
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CORA and QUENCH
Between 1987 and 1993 the CORA facility at KIT was the scene of 19 out-of-pile ex-
periments investigating the early core degradation phase. Fuel bundles representing
a PWR, BWR or WWER design were tested, using electrically heated fuel rods to sim-
ulate the decay heat. The bundles also contained non-heated fuel rods and control
rods in case of the PWR design, while for the BWR design absorber blades and fuel
channels were included. Among other goals, the tests at the CORA facility aimed at the
investigation of the oxidation behavior of the materials in order to better assess the
resulting hydrogen generation. Another point of interest was the formation of liquid
phases not due to regular melting, but due to material interaction (eutectic melting)
or chemical interactions. This included an assessment of the dissolving of uranium
and zirconium oxides by liquid zircalloy as well as relocation of molten material and
its freezing, which lead to the formation of blockages in the test bundle.
Reflooding of the degrading test bundle was performed as well, in order to observe the
fragmentation of embrittled fuel rods and the resulting formation of a debris bed. This
part is of special interest for the present work, because during the reflooding some
tests showed a massive production of hydrogen. Since the temperatures reached in
the CORA facility did not exceed 2273K, mainly the early phase of core melting was
observed with some interesting results.
It was observed for example that the zircalloy oxidation starts at a temperature of
1373K in the upper part of the bundle, thus accelerating the core heat-up, spreading
from there to upper and lower core regions successively. A number of influence factors
for the oxidation propagation have been identified, such as the availability of zircalloy
surfaces and steam, as well as the temperature evolution and cooling conditions (e.g.
reflooding conditions). Another result of the CORA tests was that the liquefaction of
the present materials often starts at temperatures lower than their individual melt-
ing temperature, which is a phenomenon mainly due to eutectic interactions and
dissolving processes. For further information, see Hoffmann et al. [32].
The QUENCH program is a direct successor of the CORA program and resembles it in
many aspects. A key difference is that legal requirements prohibited the further use of
uranium fuel pellets, thus forcing the scientists at KIT to use fuel rod simulators made
from zirconium oxide. As in the CORA facility, the fuel simulator rods had not been
irradiated previously and were subject to in-pile heating, creating temperatures of up
to 2000 K in order to survey the cladding behavior up to its failure and degradation
behavior of the fuel rod assembly. For further information, see Sepold et al. [33].
Validation of ATHLET-CD has been performed on the tests CORA-13 [34–37], CORA-17
[38], CORA-28 [39, 40] and CORA-33 [41], as well as CORA-W1 [42] and CORA-W2
[43–46]. QUENCH01 [47], QUENCH06 [48, 49], QUENCH-10 [50] and QUENCH-11
[51, 52] have been part of the ATHLET-CD validation as well.
LOFT-FP
The LOFT-FP test assembly consisted of 121 UO2 fuel rods with nuclear heating cre-
ating temperatures of up to 2400K. Different test were conducted in order to record
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fuel degradation up to the release of fission products. At the end of the tests, the
test section was flooded with water. Opposing all other experimental facilities, the
LOFT-FP facility included a model of the primary circuit, thus creating more realistic
reflooding scenarios. For further information, see Jensen et al. [53] and Nalezny [54],
for the ATHLET-CD validation see Bestele [55].
Phebus FP
The Phebus FP test assembly consisted of 21 pre-irradiated fuel rods that were subject
to in-pile nuclear heating, creating temperatures of up to 3100K. As in the LOFT-FP
tests, the experimental goal was to record fuel degradation up to the release of fission
products. One of the key differences to the LOFT experiments was the pre-irradiation
of the fuel rods in order to generate a realistic distribution of fission products in
the fuel rods. Three tests have been performed in a bundle configuration, and the
tests were terminated later in the core degradation process, thus generating a lot
of interesting data for the late phase of core degradation, while most of the other
experiments were terminated after or during the early phase of core degradation. For
further information, see Clément et al. [56] and Schwarz et al. [57].
Validation of ATHLET-CD has been performed on the tests Phebus FPT-0 [58–60],
FPT-1 [61–63] and FPT-4 [64], as well as Phebus SFD B9+ [65, 66], SFD 1-1 [67, 68] and
SFD 1-4 [69]. The Phebus SFD AIC Test [70] was part of the validation, too.
There have been other experiments for the validation of ATHLET-CD, such as CODEX
AIT-1 [71], the Halden Experiments IFA650.2 [72] and IFA650.3 [72, 73], NRU-FLHT-2
[74] and TMI-2 [75].
The validation simulations focused on different aspects of the experiments, and in-
cluded the core melt-down behavior, the general thermal behavior of the fuel rod
bundles and the oxidation reaction of the zirconium, as well as fission product release
and transport. Most results were promising and ATHLET-CD was judged as adequate
in the simulation of severe accident phenomena. In an OECD benchmark exercise,
different code systems were tested on the simulation of the TMI-2 accident scenario,
including ATHLET-CD simulations performed by GRS, IKE and RUB-LEE. The results
confirm the validity of the simulation tools, and especially thermo fluid dynamic
properties like the break mass flow rate and primary water mass showed a high degree
of synchronization.
During the progression of the accident, the diversity of the results increased, because
in the late phase modeling the user influence increases due to more uncertainties
in the models. The deviations started to become distinct with the beginning of melt
relocation in the core, and increased throughout the following degradation phases. As
far as the relocation to and behavior in the lower plenum is concerned, the results of
the benchmark differed quite a lot.
The benchmark results show that the validation state of the ATHLET-CD simulation
code is quite adequate concerning the early accident sequence, up to and including
core heat-up. During the core melting phase, the codes start to diverge and the late
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in-vessel phase dealing mostly with behavior in the lower plenum reveals that the
models used need improving, especially where the dependency on the user input is
concerned. For the conducted simulations the most recent and thus highly validated
version of ATHLET-CD has been used, which is why there has not been any further
validation conducted in this work.
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3.1 ATHLET-CD model of the reactors thermo fluid
dynamic systems
The simulated reactor is a generic German PWR (KONVOI type), which has four loops
and produces 1300 MWel of power. Its nodalisation scheme is shown in figure 3.1.
Of the four loops, the ATHLET-CD code simulates only two, thus assuming that the
three intact loops behave identical. Loop A (on the left) represents the three intact
loops and has all its quantities simply multiplied by three, while loop B (on the right)
represents the loop with the leak next to the PSL indicated by the X. For the purpose
of the present investigations, i.e. the simulation of a severe accident with loss of the
primary heat sink, it is sufficient to replace the simulation of further components of
the secondary system by boundary conditions.
3.1.1 The primary system
The primary system is simulated in two separate loops, each of them consisting of the
steam generator U-tubes, connected to the hot and cold legs by the steam generator
inlet and outlet. The cold legs host the main coolant pumps, and the hot leg in the
broken loop contains the leakage and the PSL to the pressurizer. Because the accident
scenario simulated in this work involves a leak with rapid depressurization, it was not
necessary to simulate the relief valve and relief tank, nor is the spray line at the top of
the pressurizer simulated.
The cold legs are connected to the downcomer of the RPV, which lies parallel to the
core channels and the reflector, all connected at the bottom by the volume of the lower
plenum. On top of the core channels, the upper plenum is simulated, as well as the
connection to the hot legs.
As shown in figure 3.2, the thermodynamic part of the core area is simulated as six
concentric core rings, each represented as an identical pipe object with a different
multiplication factor < 1 to account for the area fraction of the core each channel
represents. The included table shows the distribution of the core area to the six core
channels.
To allow horizontal flow in the core, the core channels are connected by so-called
cross-connection objects (CCOs). They generate junctions between all the control
volumes of the two parallel pipes, which must be identical in length, elevation and
nodalisation to allow the use of a CCO.
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Figure 3.1: Graphical representation of the simulated reactor structure with an X indi-
cating the location of the leak
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Figure 3.2: Graphical representation of the simulated core structure as six concentric
core rings
3.1.2 Secondary systems
The secondary system contains only a representation of the steam generator sec-
ondary side, with a distinct representation of the riser and downcomer, containing
a special water-steam-separator-object topped by the steam dome. A positive fill to
the downcomer represents the feedwater injection and a negative fill in the steam
dome represents the main steam line to the turbine. The steam dome also hosts a
special object to account for the presence of a pressure relief valve. The turbine and
the condensers are not simulated explicitly.
3.2 Emergency core cooling systems (ECCS)
The KONVOI-class PWRs have one passive and two active ECCSs in the primary loops.
For every leg, there is a passive hydro-accumulator with a water volume of 45 m3,
connected to the primary system by a check valve, opening below 2.6MPa. The High
and Low Pressure Injection (HPI / LPI) Pumps have to be supplied with electricity
either via AC power or the emergency diesel generators. In the simulation, all (active
and passive) injection systems are represented as fills, which are time-dependent
boundary conditions specifying mass and enthalpy flow rates. They are connected to
the primary loops by single junction pipes, in which the momentum balance is not
calculated („massless pipe“). This way, the systems do not have to be modeled, and
only their characteristics are fed into the simulation. For the high and low pressure
injection pumps, their pump characteristics (see fig. 3.3) are given in tabular form.
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Figure 3.3: Pump characteristics of the low and high pressure injection pumps (HPI
and LPI)
There is a pump dedicated to both HPI and LPI for each loop. Below 11MPa, the HPI
pumps can feed water either into the hot or cold legs of the loops with a maximum
flow rate of 77 kg/s per pump. The LPI is connected to both hot and cold legs of each
loop, and usually feeds 50 %/50 % into both legs simultaneously. It is possible, to close
either of the connections to the hot or the cold legs, leading to an injection of 100 %
into the other legs. The LPI starts its injection below 1.1MPa with a maximum flow
rate of 325.4 kg/s per pump. Connected to the cold legs, the Extra Borating System
(EBS) is modeled with a constant non-pressure dependent injection mass flow rate
of 2 kg/s per pump. Since there is no specific information available on the Volume
Control System (VCS), it was assumed to have a constant injection mass flow rate of
35 kg/s per pump.
3.2.1 Model parameters
All simulations presented in this work used the 5-equation model for the simulation
of all the thermo fluid dynamic parts of the reactor core. Most of the simulated parts
were treated as homogeneous, but in a few special objects a mixture level tracking was
implemented, namely in the steam generators and core channels. The reason for this
is that the position of the mixture level is crucial information within this area, whereas
it is not so important in others e.g. in the piping system.
The only simulated non-condensable gas was hydrogen, because nitrogen and other
gases were not judged as crucial for this kind of accident sequence. Nitrogen was
only applied in the accumulators, which are topped by a nitrogen cushion, but the
reactor protection system was assumed to close the accumulator check valves before
any nitrogen could enter the primary system.
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3.3 Properties of the reactor core
Since only the thermodynamic properties of the core are simulated by the ATHLET
module itself, it is necessary to use the module ECORE for the simulation of all the
properties of the fuel and absorber rods in the core, as well as their behavior during
the accident. So for every core channel (CORE1 to CORE6), there is a corresponding
radial core section (ROD1 to ROD6) defined in the input for the ECORE module,
which specifies the number of fuel and control rods present. Table 3.1 shows the
specifications used in the simulations. 57,900 fuel rods are simulated in total, as well
as 2328 absorber rods. Assuming the standard 18x18 geometry for fuel elements in
KONVOI type PWRs, this makes 324 rods per fuel elements (see right side of fig. 3.4).
Of these 324 rods, 24 are left empty to take in the absorber rods, leaving 300 for fuel.
So in total, the simulated core consists of 193 fuel elements, and 97 absorber rod
assemblies.
Table 3.1: Simulation properties of the radial core sections in the ECORE module
Core channel Fuel rods / Absorber rods / Radial power factor
elements assemblies
ROD1 2,700 / 9 96 / 4 1.044
ROD2 4,800 / 16 576 / 24 1.0542
ROD3 8,400 / 28 480 / 20 1.0535
ROD4 12,000 / 40 960 / 40 1.0792
ROD5 14,400 / 48 192 / 8 1.032
ROD6 15,600 / 52 24 / 1 0.8565
Total 57,900 / 193 2,328 / 97
Figure 3.4: Structure of the simulated fuel rods (on the left) and schematic of the cross
section of an 18x18-type fuel elements (on the right) [4]
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The fuel rods are simulated as cylinders, consisting ofUO2 fuel pellets inside a Zircalloy
cladding, which is modeled like α-Zr, and a small gap between pellets and cladding.
Figure 3.4 shows the structure of a fuel rod on the left, which consists of an active fuel
zone with a height of 3.9m, which is edged by an upper and lower fuel plug of 0.338m
and 0.19m height respectively.
The fuel rod is sub-divided into 22 nodes of which two represent the upper and lower
fuel rod plugs. The 20 remaining nodes have the same height of 19.5cm, as can be
seen in figure 3.6. All the results and discussion in this work will refer to the nodes
as described here. The elevation value refers to the lower boundary of the core area,
meaning the position of the core support plate.
Figure 3.5: Axial power profile (on the left) and decay heat (on the right), both gener-
ated from the ATHLET-CD input tables with linear interpolation between
the values
Figure 3.5 shows the axial power profile applied to the active zones of all the simulated
rods uniformly, as well as the decay heat that is assumed to be produced by the reactor
core after emergency shut-down. The decay heat is derived as percentage of the
nominal (thermal) power of the core, which is 3.765GW , and weighted with a radial
power factor to account for a non-uniform radial power distribution caused by a low
leakage core loading strategy (values given in tab. 3.1). This radial profile is also used
in the steady state simulation of the reactor at nominal power.
3.3.1 Properties of the core materials
Figure 3.7 shows a cross section of a fuel rod, with the UO2 pellet in orange, the
Zircalloy cladding in grey and the gap in white. The center of a fuel rod represents one
corner of the square fuel rod lattice, as can be seen on the right of figure 3.7.
The numbers 1 to 5 in figure 3.7 display the characteristic values of the fuel rod lattice,
which are given in table 3.2. From these values, the gap width between fuel pellet and
cladding can be derived to 0.085mm, and the fluid cross section of one cell comes to
95.528mm2.
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Figure 3.6: Sub-division of the fuel rods (incl. upper and lower fuel rod plug) into 22
nodes
Table 3.2: Simulation properties of the fuel rod structure
Variable Value
1 Radius of a fuel pellet 4.025mm
2 Inner radius of cladding 4.11mm
3 Fuel rod outer radius 4.75mm
4 Minimum distance between fuel rods 3.4mm
5 Distance between fuel rod centers 12.9mm
3.3.2 Model parameters
An important part of a core melting accident is the oxidation of the zirconium present
in the reactor core, because the chemical reaction produces hydrogen and is highly
exothermic:
Zr + 2H2O = ZrO2 + 2H2 + ∆H; ∆H ≈ 547 kJ / molZr (3.1)
The oxidation model used for the cladding of the fuel rods and the absorber rods
(Zircalloy, simulated like α-Zr) consists of four parts, depending of the temperature of
the material as given in table 3.3.
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Figure 3.7: Cross section of a simulated fuel rod (on the left) and schematic of the
smallest cell of the square fuel rod lattice (on the right)
Table 3.3: The four parts of the oxidation correlation
Part Temperature range Correlation
Part 1 1273 − 1800K Cathcart [76]
Part 2 1800 − 1900K Transition range
Part 3 1900 − 2100K Urbanic / Heidrick [77, 78]1
Part 4 2100 − 2700K Extrapolation range
Since the cladding is modeled like α-Zr, its melting temperature is set to 2250K. The
initial inner and outer cladding oxide layer thickness is assumed to be 6 µm.
For the simulation of the mechanical fuel rod behavior, an initial pressure of 3.2MPa
is set for the internal fuel rod pressure. The temperature of the fill gas is assumed to
be 593K at first, and the porosity of the UO2 pellets is assumed to be 0.017. The fuel
rods are simulated with a fuel rod plenum volume of 1 · 10−5 m3 each.
For the rod relocation model, table 3.4 gives an overview over the most important
values assumed in the simulations.
For the absorber and control rods, table 3.5 shows the most important values given by
the user via input. Since an encompassing description of the values for the ECORE
module is beyond the scope of this chapter, the complete input used for the ECORE
module can be found in appendix A3. The description of the parameters can be taken
from the ATHLET-CD User’s Manual [27].
1against all evidence according to Schanz et al. [79]
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Table 3.4: Overview of the most important values assumed in the simulation of rod
relocation
Parameter Value Description
ILIQUI 1 Use of the Hofmann liquefaction model
(KfK 4485, Jan. 1989)
IREMELT 1 Remelting of frozen material and blockage formation
is simulated
DDTAL 300 · 10−6 m Oxide layer thickness for the cladding failure criterion
TALLOW 2.3 · 103 K Cladding failure temperature if oxide layer thickness is
below DDTAL
DELTSL 50K Temperature difference for refreezing of the cladding
material
IOXML 16 The crust oxidation correlation is the same as for the
zirconium oxidation, see table 3.3
DHZRP 22.5 · 104 J/kg Melt enthalpy of metallic Zr
ALAMSL 30W/mK Heat conductivity of the metallic crust
WSLMAX 0.06m/s Maximum candling velocity of the melt
DELSL 1 · 10−3 m Film thickness of the metallic melt
TCOMPM 2600K Relocation or solidus temperature of UO2
TCOMPL 2800K Pseudo temperature for UO2 melting
DTSLUO 50K Temperature difference for refreezing of UO2
DTACUO 30K Temperature difference for melt accumulation
DHZRO2 2.25 · 105 J/kg Melt enthalpy of ZrO2
DHUO 1 · 105 J/kg Melt enthalpy of UO2
ANYUO 4 · 10−3 m2/s Kinematic viscosity of the ceramic melt
ALAMUO 20W/mK Heat conductivity of the ceramic crust
WSLUO 0.03m/s Candling velocity of the UO2 melt
DSLUO negative The following equation is applied:
DSLUO =
√
3
9.81
·WSLUO · ANY UO
3.4 Use of the GCSM signals in the simulations
The CGSM part of the input deck used to conduct the presented simulation has a
length of 1123 lines and consists of roughly 200 signals. It is understandably beyond
the scope of this work, to describe all of them, or even show all the code.
But in order to explain how the signals have been interwoven in this input to generate
a working reactor control system suitable to the investigated accident sequence, the
emergency cooling preparation signal (ECPS) (in German „Notkühlvorbereitungssig-
nal“ NKV) will be described. Appendix A4 shows the GCSM signals used for the
implementation of the ECPS in the input.
The ECPS is labeled „CSIG09“ in the input, and has been given the signal type „OR“, in
order to establish a logical OR link between the signals CSIG08, CSIG07 and CSIG06.
The signals CSIG08, CSIG07 and CSIG06 represent a „two-out-of-three“ logic, where
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Table 3.5: Overview of the most important values assumed in the simulation of ab-
sorber and control rod behavior
Parameter Value Description
NCRTOT 2328 Total number of control rods in the core
IWWER 0 Ag/In/Cd is used as control rod material
IWLCR 3 Radial and axial radiation is simulated as well as axial
heat conduction
CRSTAB 6.16 · 10−3 m Outer radius of the control rod guide tube
CRHU 5.55 · 10−3 m Inner radius of the control rod guide tube
CRBA 4.65 · 10−3 m Outer radius of the control rod cladding
CRBIC 4 · 10−3 m Radius of the absorber material
CRHAC 500W/m2 ·K Heat transfer coefficient between control rod and guide tube
CRTAM 1073K Melt temperature of the absorber material
ICROXM 16 The same oxidation correlation is used as for the zirconium
oxidation, see table 3.3
CROXID 6 µm Initial guide tube outer oxide layer thickness
CROXII 6 µm Initial guide tube inner oxide layer thickness
CRTVER 1523K Failure temperature of the control rod and guide tube
CRDTSL 50K Temperature difference for relocation / refreezing
DHAIC 9.56 · 104 J/kg Melt enthalpy of absorber material
ALAMCR 50W/mK Heat conductivity of crust
CRWSL 0.03m/s Candling velocity of control rod melt
CRDELS 1 · 10−3 m Film thickness of the control rod melt
in each case two of the following signals lead to the activation of one of the aforemen-
tioned signals, resulting in the activation of the ECPS:
• CSIG08: CSIG02 AND CSIG03 (pressurizer level and containment pressure differ-
ence)
• CSIG07: CSIG01 AND CSIG03 (primary pressure and containment pressure
difference)
• CSIG06: CSIG01 AND CSIG02 (primary pressure and pressurizer level)
with
• CSIG03: Pressure difference of the containment atmosphere to its nominal value
is greater than 3 kPa
• CSIG02: Pressurizer level below 2.28m
• CSIG01: Primary pressure below 11MPa
For the simulation of signal CSIG03 (containment pressure difference), the pressure
control in the containment is turned on when the break in the hot leg occurs, using
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signal NODELAY, which is then fed into the signal SPCONTAIN, which generates a
function for the containment pressure, using values specified in table PCONTAIN.
For the simulation of CSIG02 (pressurizer level), the signal PSIG03 is compared to
the given value of 2.28m, while PSIG03 is the observation variable „water level in the
pressurizer“.
CSIG01 works just like CSIG02, using the observation variable PSIG02 „pressure in the
RPV upper plenum“, and comparing the variable to the given value of 11MPa.
All the observation variables used in the simulations are shown in appendix A5. In
ATHLET-CD they are called „process signals“, and simply measure the value of a
certain variable called „VARTYPE“ at a certain location of the simulated reactor called
„OBJECTNAME“.
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Since the primary research goal was to investigate the reflooding of a partially de-
graded PWR core, a scenario had to be chosen that would lead to a core meltdown,
which could be achieved within reasonable simulation and computation times while
covering all the relevant phenomena. In order to get a core meltdown, the water
inventory has to be decimated, so it was obvious to choose a LOCA. The German risk
study phase B [12] differentiates LOCAs into three categories, depending on the size of
the leak:
• The large leak with a size from 500 cm2 to the well-known double ended guillotine
break (2F) with about 10, 000 cm2,
• the small leak with a size smaller than 25 cm2 and
• the mid-sized leak in between.
The small sized leak does not give the reactor much trouble at first, because the water
loss is slow and could easily be replaced without the core ever getting uncovered, even
though the system would have to be vented regularly in order to dissipate the decay
heat. If a total station blackout was assumed additionally, the core would eventually
uncover and melt, but it would take a high amount of simulation time to get there,
which was undesirable for performing several case studies. Also, researchers from
HZDR (Helmholtz-Zentrum Dresden-Rossendorf) have already conducted simula-
tions covering the SBLOCA scenario [80]. In case of a large break, the pressure in the
primary system decreases rapidly below the response pressure of the LPI, which will
fill the RPV before the core temperatures rise above 1000 ◦C. Both the small and the
large break scenarios were judged as controllable, quite contrary to the mid-sized
leaks.
The trouble with mid-sized leaks is that the water loss is high enough to uncover the
core, but the pressure decreases too slowly thus preventing an early start of the LPI. In
the German risk study phase B [12] the leaks with sizes from 40 cm2 to 380 cm2 were
judged as not controllable with the implemented measures of the core cooling systems
and lead to a core melting accident. Thus, a mid-sized loss-of-coolant-accident
(MBLOCA) was chosen as basic scenario.
4.1 The MBLOCA accident scenario
The initiating event is the opening of a medium sized leak of 200 cm2 in the hot leg
near the PSL. The location of the leak was chosen contrary to the German risk study
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phase B [12], because of two reasons: First, the inventory of the pressurizer can now be
assumed to empty directly into the leak thus not contributing to the water inventory
of the RPV during the accident. Second, the pressurizer is equipped with a spray line
at its top that could be used to inject water into the primary system. With the chosen
leak location, this possibility ceases to exist, accelerating the evolution of the core
melting and leaving the operator with less reflooding options.
The accident evolution described in the following is summarized in table 4.1. Notice
that the simulations include an initial calculation period at steady state conditions in
order to have a well defined plant state at the time of the accident initiation at 1000 s,
when the leak opens in the simulation.
The functionality of the high and low pressure emergency core cooling systems is
assumed to be intact at first, as well as the injection of four out of eight hydro-
accumulators. When the inventory of the flooding pool has been drained by the
ECCS, a switch to sump circulation mode has to be performed in order to ensure a
continuous core cooling. For the simulation, this switch is assumed to fail, causing
the LPI to fail and leaving the reactor without further water injection into the primary
system.
The failure of the LPI thus marks the switch from the design basis accident to a beyond
design basis accident, because without continuous water supply, the core inventory
will evaporate due to the decay heat, causing the core to dry out and melt. The
underlying assumption here is that no other form of water injection can be established
manually.
For the secondary side it is assumed that the turbine is isolated and that the secondary
water injection into the steam generators fails as well, leaving the reactor without
ultimate heat sink. These assumptions have been made, because they accelerate the
core melting process resulting in shorter simulation times.
4.1.1 Thermal-hydraulic behavior during the accident evolution
The opening of the leak results in an immediate reactor shut-down, so that only the
decay heat and the heat generated by chemical reactions have to be removed from the
core. The leakage leads to a massive loss of coolant, which again causes a significant
pressure drop in the primary system.
Figure 4.1 shows a graphical representation of four key values of the simulation in a
standardized form, which will be used throughout this work. The ordinates on the left
show the system pressure in dark green with a range from 0 to 17.5MPa and the void
fraction near the leak in light green with a range from 0.0 to 1.0. The ordinates on the
right show the summarized injection mass flow rate in light blue with a range from 0 to
1400 kg/s and the leak mass flow rate in dark blue with the same range of values. The
abscissa gives the simulation time in a certain interval, showing only the interesting
parts of the simulation for the sake of clarity. This means that in the following only
the early phase of the MBLOCA accident evolution will be discussed, which is the
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Table 4.1: Important points of the MBLOCA accident progression
Event Time
Break opening 1000 s
SCRAM 1006 s
HPI ON 1009 s
Start of accumulator injection 1598 s
LPI ON 1810 s
HPI OFF 1821 s
LPI failure 3852 s
Start of core uncovery 4157 s
Start of zirconium oxidation (AMIZO) 6410 s
Start of core melting (AMISUL) 6951 s
First sign of ballooning 7020 s
First occurrence of molten fuel (AMIUOL) 7436 s
First occurrence of metallic melt (AMIMRL) 7436 s
Start of candling 7526 s
Formation of a lower crust in the upper core region 7706 s
Failure of the crust 7928 s
First occurrence of ceramic melt (AMIKRL) 8201 s
First rod failure (ROD3) 8210 s
Start of melt relocation to lower plenum 8462 s
Complete core uncovering 9669 s
RPV failure in Node 12 (DAMAGE) 21740 s
same for all conducted simulations up to the point of reflooding. When the reflooding
simulations are discussed in the following chapters, only the behavior after reflooding
will be discussed, since the behavior before reflooding is the same as in the BaseCase
simulation discussed here.
The early phase of the MBLOCA accident evolution with its characteristic points can
be seen splendidly in figure 4.1. When the leak opens at 1000 s, the pressure drops
significantly, and the leak and injection mass flow rates show high peaks. The peak in
the injection rate is due to the emptying of the pressurizer inventory through the surge
line (SURGE), while the HPI starts after 9 s and increases in injection rate because
of the continuing pressure decrease. Nevertheless, the void fraction in the hot leg
increases to about 90 % during HPI injection and starts to decrease just when four of
the eight accumulators open at 1598 s and release their inventory of 180m3 (4 x 45m3)
into the primary loops. At 1810 s the LPI is started, which leads to high peaks in the
injection rate and to a correspondingly rising leak mass flow rate. The fluctuations
stabilize at around 2500 s, and injection and leak mass flow rates remain the same
level, until the flooding pool is empty because the switch to sump circulation failed at
3852 s, according to the assumption in the accident scenario. After the failure, the leak
mass flow rate decreases as well, and the void rises subsequently until it reaches 100 %
at around 5000 s and only steam leaves the system.
Figure 4.2 shows the injection mass flow rate broken down to the different injection
systems. After the leak opening, first of all the pressurizer injects its inventory into the
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Figure 4.1: MBLOCA: Comparison of pressure and void fraction near the leak with the
injection and leak mass flow rates during the early accident phase
Figure 4.2: MBLOCA: System pressure and injection rates of the pressurizer, accumu-
lators as well as high and low pressure injection systems. Legend: SURGE
- Injection of the pressurizer, ACCU - Injection of the accumulators, HPI -
Injection of the high pressure injection system, LPI - Injection of the low
pressure injection system
primary system (SURGE). When the pressure drops below 11MPa after 9 s, the HPI
starts automatically and injects water into the three intact hot legs and the cold leg of
the broken loop. The hydro-accumulator check valves open below a system pressure
of 2.6MPa, which is reached 598 s after the leak opening, because the injection rate
of the HPI is not sufficient to overfeed the leakage. After 810 s and below 1.07 MPa,
the LPI is started, which then cools the core by injecting water into both the hot and
the cold legs. These three points in the accident sequence can be clearly identified
in the evolution of the system pressure, as shown in figure 4.2. Through comparison
to the water level evolution in the pressurizer, it can be determined that the LPI fills
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the primary loops up to a height of about 2 m over hot leg level (3 m of water in the
pressurizer).
Since a regularly working LPI would be sufficient to cool the reactor core constantly, it
is assumed that the LPI fails as soon as the inventory of the flooding pool is drained
(3852 s). At this time, a switch to sump circulation would be necessary, which is
assumed to fail without an operator noticing. So from this time, there is no more water
injection into the primary system.
Figure 4.3: Water level evolution in the six core channels named CORE1 (innermost
core channel) to CORE6 (outermost core channel)
The evolution of the collapsed water levels in the six concentric core rings can be seen
in figure 4.3. The 0.0m mark on the RPVWaterLevel-scale corresponds to the lower
end of the active fuel rod zone. Around 1500 s the upper third of the active fuel rod
zone is uncovered for a short time, before the LPI starts and fills the primary system
way above core level. Since the LPI is assumed to fail at 3852 s, the water in the system
evaporates successively and the final core uncovering begins at 4157 s. It has to be
noted that figure 4.3 shows the collapsed water levels. Their height is evaluated by
summarizing the water present in all nodes, and pretending that there are no boiling
or other effects disturbing the surface of the water layer. In reality of course, there is
no water surface since boiling and steam flow effects lead to a turbulent mixing.
4.1.2 Accident evolution in the core
From figure 4.4 can be seen that the core temperatures start rising at 6000 s and
reach values of more than 2000 ◦C roughly 20 min later. This is especially true for
the temperatures of fuel (TB) and fuel rod cladding (TC), as well as for the vapor
temperature (TV). The liquid temperature (TL) remains low, simply because there is
no more water present in the core area at the time. The absorber rod temperature
(CRTA) shows two distinct peaks due to material relocation from the node, before it
rises to more than 2000 ◦C as well, while the temperature of the absorber rod cladding
(CRTC) follows the temperature of the fuel rod cladding (TC).
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Figure 4.4: Top: Highest material temperatures in the core (TB - Fuel temperature, TC
- Cladding temperature, CRTA - Temperature of the absorber rod material,
CRTC - Temperature of the absorber rod cladding, TL - Liquid temperature,
TV - Vapor temperature), middle: ZrO2 mass (AMIZO), Hydrogen mass (H2)
and mass of molten corium (AMISUL), bottom: Comparison of Zirconium
oxidation rate (Delta AMIZO), hydrogen production rate (Delta H2) and
the heat released by oxidation (SQOXID)
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From 6410 s the amount of Zirconium oxide in the core starts to increase slowly, even
though the cladding temperatures are still way below 1273K. This might be due to the
ATHLET-CD code extrapolating the Zirconium oxidation rate to temperatures below
the Cathcart interval from table 3.3, but no corresponding information could be found
in the manuals. From about 7200 s the amount of Zirconium oxide present in the core
changes faster, reaching its peak oxidation rate of 12.5 kg/s at 7596 s. The oxidation
rate drops to zero at 18550 s, when 40.05 % of the Zirconium have been oxidized.
The zirconium oxidation results in a massive heat release with a peak value of more
than 100MW within 10 seconds, and the oxidation rate correlates with the hydrogen
production curve and of course the heat release curve, which explains the observed
temperature rise in the core. With the start of the zirconium oxidation the amount of
zirconium oxide rises as well as the amount of molten core material, because the heat
released by the oxidation is added to the decay and structural heat at that time.
Since the control rods consist of an alloy made from Indium, Cadmium and Silver, they
show a low melting point of about 1073K, as given by the ATHLET-CD Users Manual
[27]. Due to insufficient cooling, the temperature continues to rise, and reaches the
melting temperature of the cladding (2030 K) at 7425 s in ROD1 Node 19. Only 20 s
later the eutectic interaction between ZrO2 and UO2 leads to an early start of fuel
melting.
Figure 4.5: Core status when the RPV fails at 21740 s in Node 12
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4.1.3 Accident evolution in the lower plenum
The ATHLET-CD code system has no model to predict when relocation of molten
core material to the lower plenum starts. It is up to the user to provide adequate
criteria. Here, it was decided that relocation by AIDA should be activated as soon
as ceramic melt has been produced in the core area (ECORE). This is the case at
8462 s in the MBLOCA simulations and the lower plenum module AIDA is activated
at that time. The activation of AIDA leads to an immediate relocation of 21.226 t of
molten core materials from the core area (modeled by the ECORE module) to the
lower plenum (modeled by the AIDA module). The ongoing core melting and the
continuous relocation to the lower plenum lead in the end to a relocation of nearly the
whole core inventory (about 156 t) to the lower plenum. Without mitigation measures
the process of core melt-down takes about 5.7 hours from the opening of the leak, until
at 21740 s the RPV failure is predicted according to the ASTOR failure criterion, which
was chosen via input. Figure 4.5 displays the core status at the time AIDA predicts the
RPV failure. Please note that ATHLET-CD simulates only half the of the RPV structures
shown in figure 4.5, but it was decided to mirror the simulated half in order to generate
a better picture of the RPV.
Figure 4.6: MBLOCA: Wall and melt remperatures in the lower plenum, as well as the
relocated melt and crust volume
This kind of representation of the RPV and core status can be found throughout this
work. The light blue lines mark the borders of the different objects and nodes that have
been simulated inside the RPV. There are two types of objects on display, characterized
by two scales, which are shown on the right. Solid objects like the vessel wall and the
fuel rods are characterized by temperature using the upper scale with values from 0
(black) to 2500 ◦C (yellow). All other objects containing fluids are characterized by the
void fraction using the lower scale with values from 0 (dark blue) to 1 (white). As a
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reference point for geodetic height, the elevation of 0.0m was set to the middle of the
hot and cold legs where they are connected to the RPV.
Figure 4.6 shows the temperature development in the lower plenum wall, broken
down into three lines showing the different temperature evolutions of the outer and
inner wall of the RPV as well as in the central wall area. For comparison the melt
temperature in the lower plenum is shown as well (please note the different intervals
on the ordinates), and in addition the volumes of melt and crust in the lower plenum
are displayed. It can be seen that the inner and central vessel wall reach a temperature
of 1500 − 1600 ◦C before the RPV fails. The outer vessel wall temperature does not
exceed 1100 ◦C, which means that the RPV wall does not completely melt but will fail
by creep rupture.
At the time of RPV failure, there are about 14.5m3 of melt with a temperature of more
than 1800 ◦C present in the lower plenum, and an additional volume of 2m3 of crust
enclosing the melt pool. Unfortunately, AIDA gives the volume of the melt instead of
its weight, while ECORE does the opposite. When the RPV failure occurs at 21740 s
in Node 12 of 40, the AIDA module stops and so should the simulation as a whole.
But since the AIDA module does not predict the RPV failure reliably, the simulation is
continued as if the RPV was still intact in order to observe the progress of the accident
scenario in case the RPV failure had not occurred yet.
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The main question to be answered in this work was the question whether or not a
partially degraded PWR core can be saved by some form of water injection into the
primary system, when the process of core melting has already begun. Therefore, a
core melting accident scenario was created, which was done by assuming an MBLOCA
scenario and a failure of the LPI as soon as the flooding pool is empty.
For the simulation of this so-called „reflooding“, it was assumed that the operator
notices the failure of the LPI at some point and manages to re-establish some form
of water injection, e.g. from fire pumps or existing injection systems like the ECCS,
manually.
5.1 Implementation of the reflooding injection in the
simulation model
To simulate the reflooding injection of the HPI and LPI systems, both are characterized
by a table giving the mass flow rate depending on the system pressure for one pump
respectively. From those tables, a GCSM function generator (FUNGEN) generates a
mass flow signal taking into account the current pressure in the primary system. To
activate the injection, a set signal has to be given. Two of those set signals had to be
implemented, one for the automatic injection after SCRAM (emergency shut-down
protocol of the reactor), and one for the reflooding injection. An OR function combines
these two set signals into one to activate the LPI or the HPI system respectively. This
process is shown exemplarily in figure 5.1, with emphasis on the fact that both the LPI
and HPI system consists of four identical pumps.
In order to assess all possible reflooding options, both the LPI and the HPI system
were equipped with a potential reflooding start signal. In addition, a system of hy-
pothetical middle pressure pumps (MPI) was implemented. Reason for this and the
characteristics of the system will be explained in section 5.4.2. The actual GCSM
signals implemented in the input can be found in appendix A6, while the signal type
description can be looked up in the ATHLET User’s Manual [24].
5.2 Assumptions and boundary conditions
Since the LPI was assumed to fail as soon as the flooding pool is empty in order to
generate a core melting sequence, the obvious assumption for a reflooding was to
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Figure 5.1: Schematic of the reflooding implementation, linked to the usual ECCS
representation
re-establish the sump circulation. Since the ATHLET-CD simulations do not include
the containment or any characteristics of the systems environment, the water had to
be subjected to boundary conditions, like a constant temperature of 40 ◦C. No heat-up
due to the waters circulation could be simulated, and the environmental pressure was
set to a constant value of 0.1MPa.
5.3 Reflooding configurations
Depending on the location of the injection, different reflooding configurations are
created in the core, which can be seen in figures 5.2 and 5.3.
If the reflooding injection is located in the cold legs of the primary system, the injected
water flows through the downcomer to the lower plenum of the RPV and is then
divided into the six core channels, flooding them from below. When the water is
evaporated in the core area, the created steam rises to the upper core area and either
circles through the hot legs (intact loops) or leaves the system through the leak. This is
the so-called „bottom flooding condition“ , where water and steam flow into the same
direction. A conceptual picture can be seen in figure 5.2.
If the reflooding injection is located in the hot legs instead, the water reaches the
top of the core first where part of it continues to quench the core from the top in
the so-called „top flooding condition“. The other part drains through the reflector
bypass into the lower plenum and quenches the core from below. Injection into the
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Figure 5.2: Flow paths of the water injected into the cold legs of the primary system
Figure 5.3: Flow paths of the water injected into the hot legs of the primary system
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hot legs thus creates a combined top and bottom flooding, and the steam produced by
evaporation creates a strong counter-current flow in the hot legs. A conceptual picture
can be seen in figure 5.3.
During a combined injection into both the hot and the cold legs, both flooding condi-
tions exist in parallel.
5.4 Parametric studies
With the shown assumptions and boundary conditions, different reflooding studies
were performed. In each study, a certain variable was changed while all the other
variables were held constant, in order to assess the variable’s impact on the outcome
of the simulation.
5.4.1 Study A: Variation of the beginning of reflooding
First of all, the time of the reflooding was assessed. This should account for the
progressing degradation of the core, i.e. the aim was to investigate up to which state of
degradation a flooding would successfully lead to a coolable condition. To account
for the core melting not being linear, the starting points were linked to the amount of
molten core material present in the core, given by the parameter AMISUL. Table 5.1
shows the 10 conducted simulations and the reflooding starting times.
Table 5.1: Simulations conducted with varying reflooding starting times
Amount of molten Corresponding time
core material (AMISUL)
A1 10 t 7650.0 s
A2 20 t 9126.0 s
A3 30 t 8303.5 s
A4 40 t 8428.0 s
A5 50 t 8577.0 s
A6 60 t 8833.0 s
A7 70 t 9078.5 s
A8 80 t 9197.0 s
A9 90 t 9352.0 s
A10 100 t 9631.0 s
These simulations were conducted with the LPI being the reflooding system, injecting
water in all eight legs with a 50/50 distribution between hot and cold legs of the
pump mass flow rate. This lead to a combined top and bottom flooding condition, as
described in section 5.3. It has to be noted that in simulations A1 and A2 the lower
plenum module AIDA was not yet activated, because no ceramic melt had formed in
the core area up to this point. This changes the accident evolution, which is why all
the other studies were conducted with 30 t or more of molten core material present.
58
5.4 Parametric studies
5.4.2 Study B: Variation of the reflooding system
This study was performed in order to assess the effect of different reflooding systems
on the outcome of the reflooding. In typical KONVOI type nuclear power plants (NPPs)
four active pump-systems are connected to the primary loops. Two of them are the
ECCS, the high and low pressure injection systems (HPI and LPI). The other two are the
volume control system (VCS) and the extra borating system (EBS), which is connected
to the primary loops by means of the VCS. The two latter systems are not modelled
explicitly in the present input, but were implemented as fills with a constant injection
rate independent of the system pressure. For the EBS, the assumed mass flow rate was
2 kg/s per pump, while the VCS pumps were assumed to supply 35 kg/s. As for the
HPI and LPI, each loop was assumed to have its own pump, making four pumps in
total for each system. Since in reality there are only three VCS pumps, this assumption
can be counted as optimistic. It has to be noted that the injected water has always
been assumed to be borated according to specification, meaning that implicitly the
assumption was made that the chemical control system is working uninterrupted
during the accident. Also the injection locations in the simulations differ from those
in reality, because detailed information about plant specifics was not available. Table
5.2 gives an overview of all the different injection systems used in study B.
Table 5.2: Simulations conducted with varying reflooding systems
Reflooding System Max. pressure Max. mass flow rate
B1 Low Pressure Injection System (LPI) 1.07MPa 325 kg/s
B2 High Pressure Injection System (HPI) 11MPa 77 kg/s
B3 Volume Control System (VCS) independent 35 kg/s
B4 Extra Borating System (EBS) independent 2 kg/s
B5 Generic Middle Pressure Pump (MPI) 4MPa 118 kg/s
B6 KSB’s WKTR Pump 5.1MPa 111 kg/s
B7 KSB’s WKTB Pump 4MPa 417 kg/s
In addition to the simulation of existing systems, three hypothetical middle pressure
injection systems were simulated, starting with a generic middle pressure pump
(MPI), which injects 118 kg/s, while withstanding a pressure of 4MPa. The other two
middle pressure systems are composed of condensate feed pumps from KSB AG (Klein,
Schanzlin & Becker - a German pump manufacturer). Their characteristic values given
in table 5.2 were taken from KSB’s homepage [81] and fitted with a parabolic function
of second order to generate the pressure dependent injection rate shown in figure 5.4.
5.4.3 Study C: Variation of the reflooding location
In a typical German KONVOI type NPP, the ECCSs are connected to both the hot and
the cold legs. Nevertheless, only the LPI is able to feed into all eight legs at the same
time, dividing the mass flow rate of every pump by two. It is possible to switch the
LPI to pure hot leg or pure cold leg injection, which can be done with the HPI as
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Figure 5.4: Pump curves of the different injection systems; compare with table 5.2
well. For scientific purposes, another case was accounted for, namely the HPI feeding
into both the hot and the cold legs at the same time, even though this strategy is not
implemented in the German KONVOI type NPPs. Table 5.3 summarizes the three
possible reflooding locations.
Table 5.3: Simulations conducted with varying reflooding locations
Reflooding Location Resulting pump injection
C1 Cold Legs (CL) 4 x 100 %
C2 Hot Legs (HL) 4 x 100 %
C3 Hot and Cold Legs (HL+CL) 8 x 50 %
5.4.4 Study D: Variation of the number of available pumps
In order to assess the fact that in case of a severe accident not all equipment might be
available and functioning, a fourth study has been conducted. Here, the number of
available pumps has been reduced, thus accounting for possible pump unavailability.
Table 5.4: Simulations conducted with reduced pump numbers
Number of pumps Resulting injection rate
D1 1 x LPI 325.4 kg/s
D2 2 x LPI 650.8 kg/s
D3 3 x LPI 973.2 kg/s
D4 4 x LPI 1301.6 kg/s
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5.5 Overview of all conducted simulations
Table 5.5 gives a systematic overview of all parametric simulations, characterized by
start of reflooding, reflooding system, reflooding location and whether or not the
AIDA module was activated during the course of the accident evolution. Also it is
shown, which simulations are discussed in which study (A-D), or have been used in
the discussion of the impact of the BLOCKAGE parameters and the AIDA module.
Table 5.5: Reference table for all conducted simulations
Label Start of reflooding Reflooding Reflooding AIDA Studies
System Location
BaseCase no reflooding - - YES A
A1B1C3D4 10 t LPI HL+CL YES A
A2B1C3D4 20 t LPI HL+CL YES A
A3B1C1D4 30 t LPI CL YES C
A3B1C2D4 30 t LPI HL YES C
A3B1C3D4 30 t LPI HL+CL YES A, B, C, D,
BLOCKAGE
A3B1C3D4** 30 t LPI HL+CL YES
A3B1C3D4** 30 t LPI HL+CL YES
A3B1C3D4N 30 t LPI HL+CL NO
A3B1C3D1* 30 t LPI HL+CL YES D
A3B1C3D2* 30 t LPI HL+CL YES D
A3B1C3D3* 30 t LPI HL+CL YES D
A3B2C1D4 30 t HPI CL YES
A3B2C2D4 30 t HPI HL YES
A3B2C3D4 30 t HPI HL+CL YES B
A3B3C1D4 30 t VCS CL YES
A3B3C2D4 30 t VCS HL YES
A3B3C3D4 30 t VCS HL+CL YES B
A3B4C1D4 30 t EBS CL YES
A3B4C2D4 30 t EBS HL YES
A3B4C3D4 30 t EBS HL+CL YES B
A3B5C1D4 30 t MPI CL YES
A3B5C2D4 30 t MPI HL YES
A3B5C3D4 30 t MPI HL+CL YES B
A3B6C1D4 30 t WKTR CL YES
A3B6C2D4 30 t WKTR HL YES
A3B6C3D4 30 t WKTR HL+CL YES B
A3B7C1D4 30 t WKTB CL YES
A3B7C2D4 30 t WKTB HL YES
A3B7C3D4 30 t WKTB HL+CL YES B
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Table 5.6: Reference table for all conducted simulations, continued
Label Start of reflooding Reflooding Reflooding AIDA Studies
System Location
A4B1C1D4 40 t LPI CL YES
A4B1C2D4 40 t LPI HL YES
A4B1C3D4 40 t LPI HL+CL YES A, B
A4B1C3D4N 40 t LPI HL+CL NO
A4B2C1D4 40 t HPI CL YES
A4B2C2D4 40 t HPI HL YES
A4B2C3D4 40 t HPI HL+CL YES B
A4B5C1D4 40 t MPI CL YES
A4B5C2D4 40 t MPI HL YES
A4B5C3D4 40 t MPI HL+CL YES B
A4B6C1D4 40 t WKTR CL YES
A4B6C2D4 40 t WKTR HL YES
A4B6C3D4 40 t WKTR HL+CL YES B
A4B7C1D4 40 t WKTB CL YES
A4B7C2D4 40 t WKTB HL YES
A4B7C3D4 40 t WKTB HL+CL YES B
A5B1C1D4 50 t LPI CL YES
A5B1C2D4 50 t LPI HL YES
A5B1C3D4 50 t LPI HL+CL YES A, B, AIDA
A5B1C3D4N 50 t LPI HL+CL NO AIDA
A5B2C1D4 50 t HPI CL YES
A5B2C2D4 50 t HPI HL YES
A5B2C3D4 50 t HPI HL+CL YES B
A5B5C1D4 50 t MPI CL YES
A5B5C2D4 50 t MPI HL YES
A5B5C3D4 50 t MPI HL+CL YES B
A5B6C1D4 50 t WKTR CL YES
A5B6C2D4 50 t WKTR HL YES
A5B6C3D4 50 t WKTR HL+CL YES B
A5B7C1D4 50 t WKTB CL YES
A5B7C2D4 50 t WKTB HL YES
A5B7C3D4 50 t WKTB HL+CL YES B
A6B1C1D4 60 t LPI HL+CL YES A
A6B1C2D4N 60 t LPI HL+CL NO
A7B1C3D4 70 t LPI HL+CL YES A
A8B1C1D4 80 t LPI HL+CL YES A
A9B1C1D4 90 t LPI HL+CL YES A
A10B1C1D4 100 t LPI HL+CL YES A
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*In study D, the number of LPI pumps available for reflooding was reduced from four
to one. D4 represents four pumps, D3 three pumps and so on.
**In section 7.1, the BLOCKAGE values have been changed in order to investigate their
effect.
Of the simulations not used in any of the studies, simulations A3B1C3D4N, A4B1C3D4N
and A6B1C3D4N have been conducted for the investigation of the impact of AIDA
discussed in section 7.2. Since the comparisons to the equivalent simulation with
AIDA all showed the same trend, only the comparison of A5B1C3D4 to A5B1C3D4N
was discussed.
All the other simulations, which have not been part of a study were performed for
study C in order to investigate whether the injection location has a different impact
on the simulation depending on the injecting system and the mass of molten core
material present. Since it was found to make no difference, only the 30 t simulations
with LPI injection are discussed in detail in section 6.4.
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6 Discussion of the results
In this chapter, the results of the different studies will be discussed in detail, referring
at different points to the BaseCase scenario that has been described in chapter 4. An
overwiev of all the conducted simulations has been given in chapter 5.
6.1 Coolability criteria
To decide, whether a core has reached a coolable condition, coolability criteria had to
be developed. They not only had to describe the core status as detailed as possible, but
also needed to be applicable to the used simulation tool. In this work, four different
criteria have been applied in order to assess the coolability as good as possible and
also to decide, which criterion in the most conservative.
6.1.1 Criterion I: Vessel failure
The ultimate criterion to decide whether a core melting accident can be stopped by
water injection into the primary system or not, is the failure of the pressure vessel.
As long as the RPV stays intact throughout the accident, it does not matter whether
the core has relocated to the lower plenum, or what temperature the materials inside
the RPV have. In case of RPV failure, coolability could also be established within the
containment. However, this is not subject of the present work.
The lower plenum module AIDA used in most of the conducted simulations provides
a DAMAGE factor for the lower vessel wall, which equals RPV failure as soon as the
factor reaches the value 1. Unfortunately, the AIDA module does only account for
creep failure of the vessel’s steel wall due to temperature loads charged by the melt
pool. The criterion is applied (see section 6.2), but has to be considered carefully for
two reasons:
Since the AIDA module needs a lot of user input for the simulation of melt relocation
to the lower plenum and RPV failure, its simulation results depend strongly on what
the user expects to happen during the core meltdown. For example, it has to be
specified in the input, whether or not water will be present in the lower head during
the relocation of melt from the core area, and what configuration will result in the lower
plenum. Giving that information as input renders the simulation less meaningful
and the results unobjective. The second reason for carefully applying RPV failure as
coolability criterion is its ultimacy. Whether or not the RPV fails is a yes / no decision,
and if it fails, the power plant and its environment are in danger. Therefore it was
logical to choose a criterion that emerges before RPV failure is even possible.
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6.1.2 Criterion II: Temperature criterion
The first approach to determine coolability independent of vessel integrity was to have
a look at the temperature of the core materials during the accident sequence. If the
material temperatures in all core sections would fall below the melting point of the
corresponding materials, the core would be solid and must thus be coolable.
In one of the earlier studies [82], a temperature limit of 1800 ◦C was applied, since this
is the roughly approximated melting temperature of the cladding material. Looking
at the temperature development in the whole core led to the realization that even if
one or two nodes remain at higher absolute temperatures, the core can be labelled as
coolable if the average temperature does not rise anymore.
TF =
1
132
· |Σ (TB)t2 − Σ (TB)t1
t2 − t1 | ≤ 0.076
K
s
(6.1)
An ATHLET-CD simulation gives one fuel temperature (TB) per node, making 6 x 22 =
132 values per time step. The TB-values are summarized for each time step, and
their difference for two consecutive time steps is divided by the time step size and
the number of nodes, resulting in a value for the temperature fluctuation (TF), as
given in equation 6.1. The resulting curve fluctuates heavily, but approaches the time
axis in the course of the accident, and when the variation in the value TF is smaller
than 0.076 K/s (10 K/s for the whole core divided by the 132 nodes), the core area is
assumed to be quenched.
The same kind of analysis would have to be conducted for the material that has been
relocated to the lower plenum, using the melt temperature TMELT instead of the sum
of the fuel temperatures TB. The application of a temperature criterion of this kind
is rather difficult, because it always contains a generalization or assumption chosen
by the user. For example the value of 10 K/s has simply been assumed without any
scientific background to it. For this reason, the temperature criterion was not applied
in the end.
6.1.3 Criterion III: Geometry criterion
A different approach to define coolability is to say that the core is safe when its geom-
etry stops changing. This means that all melting and relocating has stopped, even
though there might still be melt present in melt pools surrounded by crust. This
criterion is hard to apply, because a melt pool that has not changed for a given time
might still change at a later time and it is impossible to simulate the accident scenario
forever. So for the successful application of this criterion, a time value must be chosen
after which it is assumed that the geometry does not start changing again.
All simulations presented in this thesis were conducted from 0 s to 30000 s, with the
accident starting at 1000 s. The accident evolution is thus investigated for the first
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eight hours, and since some of the simulations needed up to one month to complete,
it was decided to not simulate the accident evolution any further.
Another issue with this kind of criterion is that the ATHLET-CD simulation does not
give geometry changes as a parameter, thus leaving the user with the task to assess the
geometry manually. Since this would take a lot of time and is strongly dependent on
the user, the application of this criterion was not pursued any further.
6.1.4 Criterion IV: Heat removal criterion
A core is assumed to be coolable when the total amount of heat produced in the core
can be removed at every point in time. The heat produced in the core consists of the
heat produced by chemical reactions (like metal oxidation) and the decay heat of the
fission products. On the other hand, heat can be removed from the core by radiation
to surrounding structures if the core is not covered by water.
The heat removal is done only by the water present in or pumped into the core region.
This can result in convective heat transfer to either water, steam or - in the case of a
partially covered core - a mixture of these two and boiling heat transfer.
This criterion might bear some difficulties in application, because its confirmation
would have to be done for each node in the core separately to ensure that inho-
mogenities in heat release and / or removal are taken into account. Fortunately, the
ATHLET-CD code calculates some integral power values (in W ) over the whole core,
which can be used to establish a global power balance [27]:
• TOTNPOW - Power of all fuel rods
• SQOXID - Heat generated by chemical reactions (oxidation, nitride formation)
• SQFLUI - Heat flow to fluid
• SQLOSS - Heat losses to structures
From these values, the summarized power factor SUMPOW was calculated as follows:
SUMPOW = TOTNPOW + SQOXID − SQFLUI − SQLOSS (6.2)
If SUMPOW is zero, the amount of energy produced in the core is dissipated imme-
diately by the surrounding water and / or steam, and the core has reached a stable
condition, as long as the water injection can be kept up. If SUMPOW is negative,
the amount of energy dissipated is higher than what is produced in the core area,
which means that the core is losing energy thus cooling down. On the other hand, if
SUMPOW takes on a positive value, then the amount of power produced by the core
cannot be dissipated and the core is not coolable.
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6.2 Study A: Variation of the beginning of reflooding
Study A was conducted in order to find the point of no return in the accident evolution,
where a water injection cannot stop the accident progression any more.
Figure 6.1: Mass of molten core material obtained in study A
Figure 6.1 shows the cumulative mass of molten core material (AMISUL). While in
the BaseCase scenario without reflooding almost the whole core inventory is molten
(162 t of 181 t), all conducted reflooding scenarios in study A show a stop of further
core melting after reflooding. However, this is not equivalent with a quenched core,
because the parameter AMISUL does not reflect the current mass of melt present in the
core, but summarizes all the masses that have been molten up to some point during
the accident. Figure 6.2 shows the melt mass present at each time during the accident,
and it can clearly be seen that only in case of simulation A1B1C3D4 (Reflooding after
10 t of core material have been molten) the melt mass decreases to zero. In all other
simulations, a small amount of up to 2 t of core materials stays molten inside the core
area.
Exemplarily, simulation A3B1C3D4 (reflooding after 30 t) shall be explained and ana-
lyzed in greater detail. Figure 6.3 shows the core status at the beginning of reflooding
(8300 s) on the left, and the core status at the time of the vessel failure signal (25613 s)
on the right. At the beginning of reflooding, 30 t of core material have been molten,
and the rods in core section 1, 2 and 3 have failed in node 19 after extensive ballooning
of the cladding. The degradation is strongest in rod 3, where nodes 16 to 19 have
already melted away. Below the empty nodes, the molten material has candled down
the fuel rods and formed crusts outside the cladding, leading to local blockages in the
flow paths. Nevertheless, due to relocation of molten core material from the core area
to the lower plenum shortly after the start of reflooding, the core area can be quenched
completely. This can be verified in the right picture of figure 6.3, because by then the
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Figure 6.2: Mass of melt present at each time during the accident in study A
RPV is full of water with a void value of close to zero and the fuel temperatures have
dropped to 1530 ◦C or less.
Vessel failure is calculated by the AIDA module, because the module clearly does not
account for melt-water interaction during relocation and for the heat transfer from
the melt pool to the overlaying water. This is obvious, because the void in the lower
plenum is 0.0 while the melt pool has a temperatures of approximately 1000 ◦C, which
should evaporate the overlaying water but does not. Also, the crust formed between
the melt pool and the vessel wall shows a temperature of up to 2000 ◦C, being too high
for the material to remain solid, while the temperature of the liquid melt pool has long
fallen below its solidification temperature while the material remains liquid in the
simulation.
A few nodes in the core area remain at constant high temperatures, and the reason for
those nodes not being coolable was found in the way blockages of fluid flow due to
crusts are treated by the ATHLET-CD code, which has been described in section 2.5.
During the core melting, the model applies the porosity criteria given in table 2.2 and
successively disables radial and axial flow paths for water and steam, as well as the
heat transfer from fuel and cladding materials to the surroundings. In figure 6.4 the
porosity evolution for the nodes of rod 3 is shown, as well as the porosity limits applied
by the BLOCKAGE model, according to table 2.2. It can be seen that in most of the
nodes, the porosity never decreases to 0.3, which is the porosity limit for open porosity
where the BLOCKAGE model is activated. On the other hand, there are five nodes, in
which the porosity decreases below 0.3, leading to the activation of the BLOCKAGE
model. Four of these nodes show a porosity lower than 0.25 %, which means that the
radial and axial flows as well as the convective heat transfer to the surrounding fluid
have been turned off, thus leaving the concerned nodes without an option for heat
transfer. Even when the porosity increases again due to re-melting and relocation of
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of the core status at the time of the beginning of reflooding
(left) and at the time of vessel failure (right) for simulation A3B1C3D4.
Figure 6.4: Porosity evolution in Rod 3 during simulation A3B1C3D4
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the crust, the expected cooling of the nodes does not take place.
Of the five nodes discussed, one (Node 22) is completely depleted of material, reaching
a porosity of 1.0 around the time the relocation to the lower plenum is started. In the
other four nodes, small amounts of ceramic melt remain present, as can be seen in
figure 6.5. Node 12 holds 1.25 kg, node 13 160.91 kg, node 14 197.26 kg and node 15
23.61 kg, making a total of 383.02 kg of ceramic melt mass that is not quenched and
successively heats up to more than 3000 ◦C, as proven by figure 6.6.
Figure 6.5: Current amount of ceramic melt mass present in the nodes of rod 3 during
simulation A3B1C3D4
This behavior can be explained, if it is assumed that the BLOCKAGE model can only
disable flow paths and heat transfer, but not re-enable them when the porosity in-
creases again due to candling or relocation of material out of the affected node. This
assumption has yet to be verified, since the input manual for the ATHLET-CD code [27]
only contains the values given in table 2.2 without explaining or describing anything
else about the BLOCKAGE model. Nevertheless, the observed behaviour of ceramic
melt mass in the simulation in clearly not realistic.
Consequently, the application of a temperature criterion for coolability is difficult,
because every node in every simulation would have to be treated separately resulting
in a serious amount of work. This is why in the end, criterion IV (see section 6.1.4) was
applied.
Figure 6.7 shows the summarized power factor SUMPOW for the simulations of study
A. The results show that simulations A1B1C3D4 (10 t) and A2B1C3D4 (20 t) as well
as simulation A4B1C3D4 (40 t) reach a stable condition, where the SUMPOW values
fluctuate slightly around zero after the quenching of the core is complete. The sim-
ulations A5B1C3D4 (50 t) to A10B1C3D4 (100 t) show SUMPOW values higher than
zero and have thus not reached a coolable condition, because the produced energy
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Figure 6.6: Average temperature of ceramic melt mass present in the nodes of rod 3
during simulation A3B1C3D4
Figure 6.7: Power balance of the reactor for the simulations of study A
in the core cannot be dissipated to the surroundings completely. An exception is
simulation A3B1C3D4 (30 t), which shows SUMPOW values that fluctuate heavily
around−100MW indicating a rapid decrease in energy inventory in the core area. It is
unclear, why only this one simulation shows this behaviour and where the dissipated
energy is taken from, because the core is clearly quenched at 10000 s.
The hydrogen production has to be evaluated since it can be treated as a parameter of
cladding oxidation and thus represents the present core state. Hydrogen is generated
during the oxidation of the fuel and absorber rod cladding material, which consists
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mainly of zirconium. This oxidation poses two threats simultaneously, because other
than producing vast amounts of hydrogen, it is also a highly exothermic reaction
releasing even more energy inside the core area than the decay heat. This process is in-
tensified during reflooding as can be seen for example in the „reflood map“ developed
at KIT [83], which led to the presumption that reflooding might be counterproduc-
tive when the core is heavily damaged and should thus be avoided. The simulations
conducted for this work confirm accelerated hydrogen production during reflooding,
but the results do not indicate that the reflooding is over-all counterproductive and
should be avoided.
Figure 6.8: Mass of hydrogen produced in study A
Figure 6.8 shows the accumulated amount of hydrogen produced during the accident
simulations in study A. Without reflooding, approximately 590 kg of hydrogen will
be produced, which corresponds to a zirconium fraction of 40.05 % being oxidized.
Table 6.1 summarizes the values for the amount of produced hydrogen and the degree
of oxidation for all the simulations of study A. A clear trend is visible, the earlier the
reflooding takes place, less hydrogen is produced in total corresponding to a smaller
fraction of oxidized zirconium and a lower heat generation due to the oxidation. Nev-
ertheless, the reflooding itself speeds up the oxidation for a short time, leading to an
instantly higher hydrogen generation rate but ultimately stopping the oxidation. This
can be seen in figure 6.8, where the curves for the reflooding simulations rise above
the BaseCase simulation without reflooding right after the beginning of reflooding,
but turn to a constant value afterward.
This accelerated oxidation due to the initiation of reflooding is reflected in the hydro-
gen production rates shown in the top picture of figure 6.9, where the peak oxidation
rate obviously correlates to the beginning of reflooding leading to the shift in the
position of the peaks.
The same is true for the chemical reaction heat generated by zirconium oxidation,
as displayed in the bottom picture of figure 6.9. The peak values range from about
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Table 6.1: Hydrogen produced and fraction of zirconium oxidized in the simulations
of study A
Simulation Produced hydrogen Degree of oxidation
A1B1C3D4 133.0 kg 9.02 %
A2B1C3D4 282.2 kg 16.90 %
A3B1C3D4 285.3 kg 18.53 %
A4B1C3D4 322.9 kg 21.27 %
A5B1C3D4 330.6 kg 21.73 %
A6B1C3D4 357.6 kg 23.63 %
A7B1C3D4 393.2 kg 26.19 %
A8B1C3D4 406.7 kg 27.17 %
A9B1C3D4 435.0 kg 29.18 %
A10B1C3D4 488.1 kg 32.97 %
Figure 6.9: Hydrogen production rate and exothermic heat release during oxidation
(SQOXID) in study A
40MW in simulation A6B1C3D4 (60 t) up to nearly 150MW in simulation A10B1C3D4
(100 t). This heat has to be dissipated from the core in addition to the 40MW of decay
heat at that time, thus counteracting the core cooling efforts.
Another phenomenon observed arises from the massive evaporation that takes place,
when the water injected into the primary circuits by the reflooding system (in this case
the LPI) hits the melting core with temperatures beyond 2000 ◦C. The evaporation
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leads to a pressure increase from around 260 kPa before the start of reflooding to
3.04MPa in 90 s after the start of reflooding. Unfortunately, the LPI pumps can only
withstand a counter pressure of up to 1.07MPa, and thus are unable to inject further
against the pressure after only 20 s of water injection. This behaviour can be observed
in figure 6.10, where the leak and injection mass flow rates are displayed against the
pressure and void near the leak position.
Figure 6.10: Comparison of the leak and injection mass flow rates with the pressure
and void near the leak position for simulation A3B1C3D4 (30 t).
Since the LPI injection rate drops to zero after a first injection of roughly 18.5 t of water,
the pressure decreases again, until it reaches 1.07MPa after 360 s, and the LPI is able to
inject water again. Now the process, which will be called „self-blocking effect“, repeats
itself twice, until at 9518 s the LPI is able to inject continuously, quenching the core in
the process. This pressure dependent injection behaviour of the LPI leads to nearly 20
minutes of potential reflooding time remaining unused, because the pressure is too
high for the LPI pumps to inject water into the primary circuits. If other pumps were
available, which could provide higher pressures than the LPI, those 20 minutes could
be used to effectively quench the core and thus preventing further damage to the core,
possibly even preventing vessel failure. These considerations led to the conduction of
study B.
6.3 Study B: Variation of the reflooding system
There are three different systems connected directly to the primary circuit in the
KONVOI input that contain pumps: The HPI, the LPI and the VCS. Attached to the
VCS is another system using separate pumps: the EBS. Since study A has shown that
reflooding a partially degraded PWR core with the regular LPI system leads to injection
stops due to pressure peaks, an investigation was conducted to see whether the other
potentially available pumps could perform any better. The three reflooding cases
marking the transition from coolable to non-coolable conditions, namely A3B1C3D4
(30 t), A4B1C3D4 (40 t) and A5B1C3D4 (50 t), were taken as basis, and in each case the
reflooding system was varied according to table 5.2 (p. 59). For the sake of clarity, only
the simulations based on A3B1C3D4 (30 t) will be discussed in detail.
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6.3.1 High and low pressure injection systems
Since the cause for the injection delay with the LPI was the pressure built-up, the
obvious course of action was to investigate a reflooding using the HPI system. The HPI
pumps can withstand a pressure of up to 11MPa and inject up to 77 kg/s per pump,
making a maximum injection rate of 308 kg/s in total.
Figure 6.11: Comparison of the leak and injection mass flow rates with the pressure
and void near the leak position for simulations A3B1C3D4 (LPI) and
A3B2C3D4 (HPI)
Figure 6.11 shows a comparison of the reflooding with the LPI and HPI, in which the
injection gap of about 20 min in the LPI reflooding is marked in red. Using the HPI
instead of the LPI does not lead to an injection gap at all, because even though the
pressure does built up to 2.9 MPa following the start of reflooding, the HPI pumps
continue their water injection uninterruptedly.
The void decrease starts immediately after reflooding, and the core is quenched much
faster. This can be seen from figure 6.12, where the core status after 5min of reflooding
is shown for both the simulations A3B1C3D4 (LPI) and A3B2C3D4 (HPI). At this time
in the reflooding process, the LPI is still shut down because of the pressure built-up in
the system, leaving the core materials at temperatures of up to 2000 ◦C.
At the same time the HPI has already flooded and quenched most of the core, with
only a few blocked nodes remaining at high temperatures. But since those nodes are
surrounded by cold ones and water, they do not pose a threat to the integrity of the
safety barriers any more.
It has to be noted that the lower plenum module AIDA does not account for the heat
transfer from the melt pool to the overlaying water, because in both cases the lower
plenum is completely filled, thus giving the same results for the melt behaviour in the
lower plenum in both simulations.
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Figure 6.12: Comparison of the core status after 5 minutes of reflooding for simulations
A3B1C3D4 (LPI) and A3B2C3D4 (HPI)
6.3.2 Middle pressure injection systems WKTB and WKTR
The next question that came to mind was whether the results might be optimized by
using a hypothetical middle pressure injection (MPI) system that can withstand the
pressure built-up of 3MPa while at the same time injecting more water than the HPI.
Thus the MPI system was implemented into the simulation, and since the results of
the corresponding simulation (A3B5C3D4) were promising, a research for pumps with
similar characteristics was undertaken, revealing two available KSB pumps: WKTB and
WKTR. Both pumps are condensate feedwater pumps and might actually be available
on site of the NPP, even though their use in a severe accident might not have been
considered yet.
Figure 6.13 shows the comparison of the reflooding using the WKTB and WKTR pumps
as middle pressure reflooding system. This means that each loop was equipped with
its own pump, leaving the system with four available pumps. It can be seen that the
WKTB pumps with their injection rate of up to 417 kg/s quench the system very fast,
withstanding the pressure built-up easily. The WKTR pumps are a lot more similar to
the HPI pumps with a slightly higher injection rate, thus showing a similar quenching
behaviour as the HPI. Nevertheless, both the WKTB and the WKTR pump system can
quench the core in a matter of minutes, as can be seen in figure 6.14. The core status
after 5min is in case of the WKTR nearly the same as with the HPI system, while the
WKTB pumps have filled the RPV almost to the top at this point, thanks to their high
injection mass flow rate.
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Figure 6.13: Comparison of the leak and injection mass flow rates with the pressure
and void near the leak position for simulations A3B6C3D4 (WKTR) and
A3B7C3D4 (WKTB)
Figure 6.14: Comparison of the core status after 5 minutes of reflooding for simulations
A3B6C3D4 (WKTR) and A3B7C3D4 (WKTB)
From efficiency’s point of view, it would be very useful for the reflooding, if middle
pressure injection pumps were available. Such a system is currently not implemented
in German NPPs, but maybe it should be considered to invest into such pumps or
to at least equip fire trucks near NPPs with pumps that can withstand the expected
pressure built-up during the reflooding.
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6.3.3 Volume control and extra borating system
The results of the reflooding using the VCS (A3B3C3D4) and EBS (A3B4C3D4) pumps
were unexpected. An injection rate this low was not considered to make much dif-
ference in the accident evaluation, but a comparison of the results refuted this ex-
pectation. A rough estimation of the energy that can be dissipated by heating water
from 40 ◦C to 2330 ◦C (see fig. 6.6, p. 72) was done with the formula for the specific
evaporation heat:
∆Q = m · c ·∆T (6.3)
With a value of 2290K for ∆T and 4200 J
kgK˙
at standard pressure for c, the amount of
energy that can be dissipated by the injection of 35 kg/s by the VCS comes to 337MW ,
while the result for the injection of 2 kg/s by the EBS gives a value of 19.2MW . These
values indicate that the injection with the VCS should be able to dissipate the decay
heat of about 45MW easily, while the EBS can only dissipate 43 % of the decay heat.
Figure 6.15: Mass of molten core material obtained in study B
Considering the mass of molten core material shown in figure 6.15, the final value
in the VCS simulation is 38.79 t and 98.25 t in the EBS simulation. In comparison,
the mass of molten core material reaches a value of 156 t in the BaseCase simulation
without reflooding. This shows that even a water injection of a few kilos per second
could save a considerable amount of core material from melting.
A similar behavior can be observed for the hydrogen production during the evolution
of the accident shown in figure 6.16. The final value for the VCS simulation is 325.2 kg
and 443.7 kg for the EBS simulation. 590.4 kg of hydrogen were produced in the
79
6 Discussion of the results
BaseCase simulation, thus proving that the reduced amount of molten core material
even in the EBS simulation leads to a reduction in the amount of produced hydrogen
as well.
Figure 6.16: Mass of hydrogen produced in study B
Figure 6.17: Comparison of the core status after 5 minutes of reflooding for simulations
A3B3C3D4 (VCS) and A3B4C3D4 (EBS)
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5 minutes into the reflooding, the core status in the VCS simulation looks even slightly
better than in the LPI simulation, because the VCS system is modelled with a pressure
independent injection mass flow rate (see fig. 6.17), which can be considered real-
istic since the VCS is designed to work under nominal reactor operation conditions
(~16MPa). This results in the core being quenched to more than 50 % using the VCS
system for the reflooding, while in the LPI simulation (see fig. 6.12), the reflooding
is still stuck in the pressure built-up, which counteracts the injection. In the EBS
simulation (see fig. 6.17), not much can be seen after only 5 minutes of reflooding. The
core status is very similar to the core status without reflooding, and the differences
in the accident evolution between the BaseCase simulation and the EBS reflooding
become important at a later point in the simulated sequence and can be seen better
in the graphs than in the figures picturing the core status at a certain time.
Figure 6.18: Comparison of the core status at the end of the simulation for simulations
A3B3C3D4 (VCS) and A3B4C3D4 (EBS)
However, an assessment of the core status at the end of the simulation shown in figure
6.18 is of interest. In the VCS simulation, the RPV is now filled way above core level
and the core is quenched with an exception of a few single nodes, which do not pose a
threat to the power plant any more, as long as continuous cooling can be maintained.
The EBS on the other hand is not able to fill the RPV above core level. This results in
further core melting and continuous relocation to the lower plenum. At the end of
the simulation, the core is quenched as well, but the amount of material relocated to
the lower plenum is nearly four times as high as in the VCS simulation. This result
indicates that an injection of 2kg/s is not enough to stop the core melting process
quickly, even though it mitigates the amount of relocated material in comparison to
the BaseCase scenario by a factor of 0.57.
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It can be seen however that in both the VCS and EBS simulation, the amount of core
material relocated to the lower plenum is higher than in the reflooding with bigger
pump systems as shown in figure 6.19. In case of the EBS simulation, roughly 100 t will
end up in the lower plenum, leading to a condition that will most likely not be coolable
no matter what the external conditions might be. In case of the VCS simulation, the
relocated material might form a coolable debris bed, if the melt fragments during its
interaction with the water in the lower plenum. For more information and a detailed
discussion, see section 7.2.
Figure 6.19: Mass relocated to the lower plenum in study B
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6.3.4 Results for reflooding after the formation of 40 t or 50 t of melt
The simulations of study B conducted for the reflooding after 40 t and 50 t show
basically the same results as the simulations for reflooding after 30 t. All systems
with high injection rates (LPI, HPI, MPI, WKTB and WKTR) quench the core more or
less fast, while producing similar amounts of hydrogen. The VCS and EBS systems
are slower due to their lower injection mass flow rates, but nevertheless save a large
amount of core material from melting and relocating to the lower plenum.
A difference between the study conducted for reflooding after 30 t and the studies for
reflooding after 40 t and 50 t can be found in the power balance of the reactor. The
power balance was calculated as a sum of powers created inside the reactor core and
powers lost from the core. For details see section 6.1.4
Figure 6.20: Power balance of the reactor in study B for reflooding after 30 t
In the study with reflooding after 30 t, shown in figure 6.20, the VCS system is able to
bring the power balance close to zero, meaning that the amount of energy produced
inside the core is nearly completely removed to the structures and surrounding fluid,
creating a kind of meta-stable cooling condition. In the EBS and BaseCase simulation,
the power balance is clearly positive, which indicates an insufficient cooling, because
more heat is generated than can be removed. All other simulations show highly
negative power balances. This indicates a removal of high amounts of energy from the
core, leading to its fast quenching.
A comparison to the study with reflooding after 40 t reveals that the VCS is no longer
able to bring the power balance close to zero. In fact it remains at a low positive
value, meaning that the core should slowly heat up despite of the water injection. The
stronger systems on the other hand all quickly bring the power balance to zero, thus
quenching the core and keeping it in a coolable condition afterwards.
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Figure 6.21: Power balance of the reactor in study B for reflooding after 40 t
Figure 6.22: Power balance of the reactor in study B for reflooding after 50 t
Power balance studies conducted with reflooding after 50 t prove the alleged trend
derived from the studies for reflooding after 30 t and 40 t. In figure 6.22, it can be
seen that the VCS produces a power balance of positive value, just as the systems with
higher pressure heads do. The reason for this behaviour is that the power balance does
not consider the melt in the lower plenum. Thus, the stronger the core degradation is
and the more material has been relocated to the lower plenum, the less decay heat is
considered necessary to remove from the core area, which is why the VCS now removes
as much heat as the bigger systems.
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6.4 Study C: Variation of the reflooding location
By default, the LPI inject into both the hot and cold legs at the same time. But with
regard to the self-blocking effect, a pure bottom flooding condition might be advanta-
geous because it reduces the counter current flows in the core area and might reduce
the pressure built-up in the RPV. It is possible, to switch the LPI from injecting into
both the hot and cold legs of each loop to injecting into either only the hot or only
the cold legs even though it is not standard procedure. The goal in study C was to
investigate whether the injection location and the resulting core flooding conditions
have an influence on the outcome of the simulation. These conditions have been
described in section 5.3.
6.4.1 Reflooding via the cold legs
Reflooding using only the cold legs leads to a bottom flooding condition. During a
bottom flooding, the water enters the core from below, while the produced steam rises
to the top of the RPV and leaves the system through the leak in the hot leg. This means
that entering water and exiting steam flow in the same direction, thus not creating
unnecessary counter-current flow conditions. For this reason, bottom flooding is
generally considered to be more effective that top flooding.
Figure 6.23: Comparison of the leak and injection mass flow rates with the pressure
and void near the leak position for simulation A3B1C1D4 (CL)
In figure 6.23 the previously discussed behaviour of the LPI reflooding is clearly visible.
The start of the injection leads to a pressure built-up, which shuts the injection down
again. This is repeated three times, and it takes 22.5min until the LPI can start to inject
water continuously.
Interestingly, the dead time is even a little higher than with the combined top and
bottom flooding condition, achieved by injecting into both the hot and the cold legs
of the system, where it took 20min for the pressure to decrease far enough for the LPI
to start working continuously (see figure 6.10). This finding is opposed to the fact that
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the summarized amount of water injected during the peaks is 7 t lower in the bottom
flooding simulation than it was in the combined top and bottom flooding simulation.
The prolonged shut-down time can thus not be explained by a higher pressure due to
a higher amount of injected water.
Figure 6.24: Comparison of the core status after 5 minutes of reflooding and at the end
of the simulation for simulation A3B1C1D4 (CL)
The core status during the cold leg reflooding shown in figure 6.24 however does not
differ significantly from the combined hot and cold leg reflooding shown in study
A (see figure 6.3). At the end of the simulation, the resulting core configuration is
virtually identical.
6.4.2 Reflooding via the hot legs
Using only the hot legs for the reflooding, leads to a top and bottom flooding condition.
This condition is characterized by strong counter current flows inside the core area,
because the water flowing down into the core is opposed by steam rising upwards.
This condition is expected to be less effective than the bottom flooding, and the simu-
lation results confirm this expectation. Figure 6.25 shows the reflooding through the
hot legs, and it can clearly be seen that it takes more than half an hour (32.8min to be
exact) for the LPI to establish a continuous injection, thus confirming the expectation
of top flooding being less efficient than pure bottom flooding.
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Figure 6.25: Comparison of the leak and injection mass flow rates with the pressure
and void near the leak position for simulation A3B1C2D4 (HL)
Figure 6.26: Comparison of the core status after 5 minutes of reflooding and at the end
of the simulation for simulation A3B1C2D4 (HL)
Nevertheless, the core status both after 5 minutes of reflooding and at the end of
the simulation shown in figure 6.26 does not differ significantly from the combined
reflooding in study A (see figure 6.3). These results prove that the choice of injection
location is a lot less relevant than the choice of reflooding system, which was shown in
study B.
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6.5 Study D: Variation of the number of available pumps
This study was inspired by the safety principle of redundancy and the underlying
assumption that in case of an accident a certain fraction of systems like pumps might
not be available. This is the reason why there are always a higher number of safety
relevant systems on site than needed. The question arose, whether instead of the usual
four pumps three or less pumps might have a chance to quench a partially molten
reactor core as well. Another question is, whether a successful quenching can be
achieved by a high injection rate (number of pumps) rather than a high pump pressure
(type of pump). In study D simulation A3B1C3D4 (reflooding with the LPI after 30 t)
was taken as basis, where all four LPI pumps are working properly. Derived from this,
simulation A3B1C3D3 was conducted with three LPI pumps available, A3B1C3D2 with
two and A3B1C3D1 with only one LPI pump.
Figure 6.27 shows the resulting core status at 5 minutes after the start of reflooding
for all four simulations. It can be seen that the temperatures in the core are the lower
the more pumps are available, even though the water inventory in the core is not
significantly different in the four simulations. This is due to the fact that the water
mass injected during the first 5 minutes of reflooding varies from 19.10 t in case of
four available pumps to 14.61 t in the simulation where only one pump is available.
The water hits the core from the top, where it evaporates quickly thus cooling the
fuel rods. In accordance to the different amounts of injected water, the pressure peak
height varies from 3.03MPa reached after 80 sec of reflooding in case of all four pumps
available to 1.91MPa after 30 sec of reflooding in the simulation with only one pump
available.
At the end of the simulation, the core status of simulation A3B1C3D1 (one pump) is
very different from the core status in the other three simulations, shown in figure 6.28.
While the other three pump configurations manage to quench the core completely
sooner or later, the RPV remains less than half filled in the simulation with only one
pump. This effect can be explained by looking at the reflooding evolution in figure
6.30.
From top to bottom, the reflooding evolution is shown for decreasing available pumps
number. In simulation A3B1C3D4 (four pumps available) the self-blocking effect of
the LPI system in clearly visible, and it takes 20.3 min until the LIP can establish a
continuous water injection. Using three instead of four pumps for the reflooding
expands the self-blocking effect, and in simulation A3B1C3D3 it takes 41.1min until a
continuous injection can be established. In simulation A3B1C3D2 only two LPI pumps
were assumed to be available, and the time during which the self-blocking controls
the reflooding has expanded to 119.5min.
With only one pump available, the self-blocking effect cannot be overcome completely
during the simulated 30, 000 s. Though the pressure built-up is not high enough to
shut the LPI pump down completely, it remains with an injection rate of roughly
25 kg/s and a system pressure of 1.06MPa throughout the simulation time, showing
an equilibrium state between decay heat and dissipated heat by evaporation on the
one hand, and between water injection and pressure on the other hand.
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Figure 6.27: Comparison of the core status after 5 minutes of reflooding for the simu-
lations of study D (top left:A3B1C3D4 - four pumps, top right: A3B1C3D3
- three pumps, bottom left: A3B1C3D2 - two pumps, bottom right:
A3B1C3D1 - one pump
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Figure 6.28: Comparison of the core status at the end of the simulations of study D (top
left:A3B1C3D4 - four pumps, top right: A3B1C3D3 - three pumps, bottom
left: A3B1C3D2 - two pumps, bottom right: A3B1C3D1 - one pump
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Figure 6.29: Power balance of the reactor in study D for reflooding after 30 t
A look on the power balance shown in figure 6.29 on the other hand reveals that in
all four simulations investigated in study D the reactor should be coolable, because
SUMPOW is negative, meaning that less energy is produced in the reactor core than is
dissipated to the surroundings. This finding led to another conduction of simulation
A3B1C3D1, but with a simulation time twice as high as before (60000 s instead of
30000 s). The expectation was to see the self-blocking effect collapse sometime after
30000 s, and the core being quenched completely in the aftermath.
Unfortunately, no collapse of the self-blocking effect could be observed. Pressure and
injection rate remain the same, and the injection is blocked further until the end of
the extended simulation at 60000 s. The core status after 60000 s on the other hand,
is different as shown in figure 6.31. The water level has not improved much, but the
steam cooling is taking effect on the temperatures of the fuel remaining inside the core
area. After 60000 s, most of the nodes show a temperature below 1000 ◦C, meaning
that the materials have solidified and should be coolable by now.
Figure 6.32 shows a section of the reflooding evolution, where a small disturbance can
be seen. This disturbance happens at the same time as the temperature drop that can
be observed throughout the core (see fig. 6.33), as well as the small rise of the water
level inside the core area.
During the 1000 s of disturbance, the pressure decreases a little, enabling the LPI to rise
its injection rate. The previous balanced cooling condition is thus disrupted, leading
to injection peaks nearly four times as high as before. In the time interval between
18500 s and 19500 s, a water mass of 37.02 t is injected into the core compared to the
average 29.70 t of water that would have been injected during this time in the previous
balanced cooling condition.
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Figure 6.30: Comparison of the reflooding evolution for the simulations of study D
(from top to bottom:A3B1C3D4 - four pumps, A3B1C3D3 - three pumps,
A3B1C3D2 - two pumps and A3B1C3D1 - one pump
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Figure 6.31: Comparison of the core status at the original end of simulation A3B1C3D1
(one pump) and after an additional 30000 s of simulation time
Figure 6.32: Comparison of the leak and injection mass flow rates with the pressure
and void near the leak position for simulation A3B1C3D1 (one pump)
after an additional 30000 s of simulation time
So an additional amount of 7.32 t of water is injected during the disturbance, which
leads to the abrupt cooling of still hot upper core parts. The water levels in the core rise
only about 0.3m over the time interval of the disturbance, while the core temperatures
drop rapidly by up to 700 ◦C.
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Figure 6.33: Fuel temperature evolution in the six core channels during the extended
simulation A3B1C3D1 (one pump)
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considerations
In this chapter, some considerations shall be made concerning the sensitivities and
uncertainties of the conducted simulations with the ATHLET-CD code systems. This
is necessary, because not only the user-given input data contains uncertainties and
assumptions, but also the simulation tool itself.
It is beyond the scope of this work to give a full overview of all the assumptions and
models used in the ATHLET-CD code system, but at least two important factors will
be discussed. These two have been chosen, because they had a major impact on the
conducted simulations presented in this work.
7.1 The BLOCKAGE input parameters
The BLOCKAGE input parameters are porosity boundaries used in the BLOCKAGE
module of the ECORE module for the simulation of melt path blockage during core
melting. It is a very coarse modelling approach, where the values for radial and axial
coolant flow as well as convective heat transfer to fluid are artificially decreased to
zero one after another, after which the radiative heat transfer is strongly increased
before the value for melt candling is decreased to zero as well. All shown simulations
have been conducted with the default values given in table 2.2, which were taken from
the ATHLET-CD User Manual [27]. Unfortunately, no further information on these
values or the blockage model itself was available.
From a purely geometrical point of view, the default values seem to be too high. A good
value to stop the radial coolant flow would be when the fuel rods are just touching each
other due to the enlargement of their diameter due to candling and accumulation of
melt (see fig. 7.1). With the geometry values given in table 3.2, the value of the initial
porosity is 57.4%, while the porosity value of the touching fuel rods comes to 21.45%.
Opposed to this, the default value used for the stop of radial flow in the BLOCKAGE
module is 27%. Only 2% lower, at a porosity value of 25%, the axial flow is turned off as
well, even though a quarter of the channel is still open - at least on average. Of course
one could argue that the candling is not uniform over the core and that even with a
porosity value of 25% a node can be blocked off from coolant ingress. Nevertheless,
since no other information on the model or underlying considerations is available, a
critical assessment is not possible.
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Figure 7.1: Schematic of the enlarged fuel rod diameter due to candling of melt
In order to assess the impact of the BLOCKAGE parameters, simulation A3B1C3D4
(30t, LPI HL+CL) was chosen as basis. Now two more simulations were conducted in
which the BLOCKAGE values were raised by 10 % or reduced by 10 % respectively. The
resulting values are summarized in table 7.1.
Table 7.1: BLOCKAGE values used in the BLOCKAGE study
Simulation POPEN PCLSR PCLSX PCONV BLOCKG
A3B1C3D4 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.20 0.10
A3B1C3D4 + 10 % 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.30 0.20
A3B1C3D4 - 10 % 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.00
The simulations showed different behaviour of the core melting process, which is
mainly due to the changes in the parameters PCLSR and PCLSX, which limit the radial
and axial coolant flow. By default they are set to 27 % and 25 % respectively, which
means that in the +10% - simulation the radial and axial flows are turned off even
sooner at 37 % and 35 %. This leads to an earlier blocking of the fuel channels and a
lower cooling capability, since the water is less able to penetrate into the degrading
core. On the other hand, the reduction in water ingress results in a reduced oxidation,
thus decreasing the heat and hydrogen content produced by the zirconium reaction.
Figure 7.4 shows mainly one oxidation peak, which occurs during the start of reflood-
ing. It can be assumed that before reflooding the core was in a steam starvation
condition, the ingress of water lead to a massive production of steam, thus enabling
the zirconium oxidation.
In the simulation with reduced BLOCKAGE values (−10%), figure 7.2 shows an ad-
vanced degradation status of the core compared to the +10% - simulation. This might
seem counterintuitive at first since the blocking of the channels occurs later in the
simulation and the water should have enhanced penetration capabilities and thus
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Figure 7.2: Comparison of simulation A3B3C1D4 with 10 % higher BLOCKAGE values
on the left and simulation A3B3C1D4N with 10 % lower BLOCKAGE values
on the right five minutes into the reflooding (upper row) and at the end of
the simulation (lower row)
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result in a better cooling. But it has to be taken into account that the reduction of
the BLOCKAGE values also results in a higher oxidation and heat release, leading to a
faster degradation of the core, even before the start of reflooding.
Figure 7.3: Comparison of the hydrogen production during the three simulations
investigated in the BLOCKAGE study
Figure 7.4: Comparison of the oxidation heat produced during the three simulations
investigated in the BLOCKAGE study
The comparison of the hydrogen produced during the three simulations in figure
7.3 shows that the difference between the simulations with increased and decreased
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BLOCKAGE values is more than 100 kg, the simulation with increased values being the
one with the lowest hydrogen production, just as expected.
The comparison of the released oxidation heat in figure 7.4 confirms this result. Al-
though the highest peak for the simulation with increased BLOCKAGE values is more
than twice as high as in the other two simulation, the summarized heat release is
only 3.43GW , while in the simulation with default BLOCKAGE values the summarized
oxidation heat is 4.45GW , and 5.00GW in the simulation with decreased BLOCKAGE
values. This does also mean that the amount of heat that has to be dissipated from
the core is reduced by 1GW to 1.5GW in total, leaving the simulation with increased
BLOCKAGE values with the best (but most unrealistic) reflooding result.
Figure 7.5: Porosity evolution in Rod 3 during the simulation with decreased BLOCK-
AGE values
Figure 7.6 shows a comparison of the reflooding evolution for the three simulations,
and it can clearly be seen that the self-blocking effect of the LPI is stronger, the higher
the BLOCKAGE values are. Nevertheless, the coolability of the core increases with
increasing BLOCKAGE values, even though the quenching process itself takes longer.
This is due to the fact that in the simulation with decreased BLOCKAGE values the
porosity can decrease to zero, meaning a complete blocking of certain nodes.
The blocked nodes can be identified by looking at the porosity evolution, exemplarily
shown in figure 7.5 for rod 3. The nodes with the lowest porosity are also the ones that
remain at the highest temperatures, as can be seen in figure 7.2.
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Figure 7.6: Comparison of the reflooding evolution during the three simulations inves-
tigated in the BLOCKAGE study with decreasing BLOCKAGE values from
top to bottom (default values in the middle)
7.2 The impact of the lower plenum modelling
The AIDA module simulates the relocation to and behaviour of molten core materials
in the lower plenum and has been described in section 2.6. Since the ATHLET-CD
simulations can be conducted with or without using the AIDA module, the obvious
question arose how the simulation is affected by use of the lower plenum module
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AIDA. Thus simulation A5B3C1D4 was chosen as basis and the AIDA module was
turned off, creating simulation A5B3C1D4N.
Without the AIDA module, the molten core materials candle down the fuel rod struc-
tures and accumulate over a not explicitly simulated lower core plate, which marks
the lower border of the ECORE module’s jurisdiction. Using the AIDA module leads
to a relocation of the candling melt to the lower plenum, thus freeing the core area
from molten corium and blockades between the fuel rods, leading to a better cooling.
On the other hand, molten corium now accumulates in the lower plenum, heating
up the lower plenum wall and leading to creep-failure of the RPV. This difference is
depicted in the upper row of figure 7.7, where the first relocation has taken place in
the simulation using the AIDA module, while in the simulation not using the AIDA
module, the molten materials candle down the fuel rods and start forming blockades.
The influence of this behaviour can be seen in the lower row of figure 7.7, where the
core area has been quenched to a high extent in the simulation using the AIDA module,
because most of the excess material forming blockades between the fuel rods has
relocated to the lower plenum. In the simulation not using the AIDA module, the
blockades formed between the fuel rods lead to the formation of a molten pool inside
the core area, which is surrounded by a frozen crust. This crust shows porosities low
enough to make it impenetrable for water, leaving the affected nodes without any
form of cooling and thus very high temperatures of around 2000 ◦C.
In the simulation using the AIDA module, about 36.49 t of molten core materials
relocate to the lower plenum, consisting of 20.98 t of ceramic material and 15.52 t of
metallic material (10.98 t from the fuel rods and 4.53 t from the control rods). The
process starts with the sudden relocation of 21.23 t of molten core materials, the
other 15.27 t are relocated slowly over the next 23.3min. The relocated material forms
an oxidic molten pool, which is the configuration that was chosen by input. The
other possible configurations are „debris bed“ and „melt stratification“ but using
these configurations did not result in numerically stable simulations. The successive
wall heat-up leads to failure of the RPV at 21177 s, but since the AIDA module is not
able to simulate the fragmentation of the melt when it hits the water in the lower
plenum, or the formation and cooling of a debris bed and also does not account
for any interaction with the overlaying water, this results are not very useful. This
discovery however sparked the idea to use IKE’s own MEWA tool for the simulation of
the melt behaviour in the lower plenum, for further information see [84].
In summary the use of the lower plenum module AIDA improves the coolability of the
core area, because the AIDA module relocates the melt candling down the rods to the
lower plenum thus preventing the formation of excessive blockades between the rods.
On the other hand, the melt in the lower plenum is likely to destroy the RPV at some
point, even if the simulation tool AIDA is very rudimentary and does not give reliable
data.
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Figure 7.7: Comparison of simulation A5B3C1D4 using the AIDA module on the right
and simulation A5B3C1D4N not using the AIDA module on the left at the
moment of the first relocation of melt to the lower plenum (upper row) and
after 10500 s simulation time (lower row)
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The objective of this work was to investigate a late water injection into a partially
degraded PWR core and to evaluate whether such a degraded core can be cooled.
Simulations with the ATHLET-CD code system have been conducted, assessing a
beyond design basis accident sequence in a German KONVOI type PWR. A basic
scenario was selected and consisted of a 200 cm2 leak in the hot leg next to the PSL,
combined with the failure of the ECCS as soon as the flooding pool is empty and a
switch to sump circulation would be necessary. This failure leads to a core melting
accident and in its discourse 156 t of core materials are molten and relocated to a high
extend to the lower plenum, eventually leading to the failure of the vessel wall.
Based on this accident simulation, a reflooding scenario was created in order to
investigate the effects of a late water injection into a partially degraded PWR core. Four
different studies have been carried out, the first being study A in which the reflooding
was performed with the LPI injecting 50 % / 50 % into both the hot and the cold legs of
the system. The variable in study A was the time at which the reflooding was started,
correlating to different amounts of molten core materials present in the core.
From study A, three simulations were judged as „critical“: the reflooding after 30 t, 40 t
and 50 t. The simulations with reflooding after 10 t and 20 t were excluded from the
analysis, because the lower plenum module AIDA had not been activated due to lack
of ceramic melt present in the core. The simulations with even higher amounts of melt
(> 50 t) present before the reflooding is started tend to not give coolable conditions
any more.
The second study, study B, investigated the reflooding with different pump systems,
namely the LPI and HPI, as well as the VCS and EBS and three hypothetical middle
pressure systems: MPI, WKTB and WKTR. The results of the simulations with the LPI
system revealed a self blocking effect of the system, because it can only withstand a
pressure of up to 1.07MPa while the water injection creates pressure peaks with up
to 3MPa. The HPI does not show this effect because the pumps can withstand up to
11MPa, but the injection mass flow rate is rather low.
For scientific reasons, a hypothetical middle pressure system MPI was created, fol-
lowed by simulations with reflooding systems consisting of KSB’s WKTB and WKTR
pumps. In these simulations the core was quenched much faster, because the pumps
have rather high injection mass flow rates combined with a pressure head of 4MPa or
higher, thus preventing the self blocking effect of the LPI.
The only other system with a direct connection to the primary system is the VCS, which
also hosts the EBS pumps. Both systems were modelled with a constant injection rate
of 35 kg/s for the VCS and 2 kg/s for the EBS, assuming that the pumps should be able
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to withstand the primary system’s nominal pressure. It was found that even though
both systems cannot quench the core effectively like the LPI or HPI, their usage does
make a big difference to the BaseCase simulation without reflooding. Even the EBS is
able to safe 50 t of core materials from melting compared to the BaseCase simulation,
which reduces the load on the lower plenum walls and creates additional time for
other mitigation measures as well.
The next question was whether or not the location of the injection makes a difference
in the outcome of the simulation, because both the LPI and HPI can be switched
from cold leg injection to hot leg injection. A combined injection 50 % / 50 % was
investigated as well, because at least the LPI is by design able to do this kind of injection.
This investigation was called study C, and included all the analyzed injection systems
from study B. It turned out that the reflooding location does not influence the outcome
of the simulation too much, even though a reflooding via the cold legs seems to be
beneficial because it leads to a bottom flooding condition without the counter-current
flow condition found during top flooding.
Study D now investigated scenarios, where not all four redundancies of the LPI pumps
were available, to answer the question whether a reduced number of pumps would be
able to quench the core as well. The chosen scenario was the reflooding with the LPI
system into both the hot and cold legs after 30 t of core materials had been molten.
Four simulations were carried out, reducing the number of available pumps by one
each.
The results indicate that three or two pumps are able to quench the core as well, even
though the self-blocking effect of the LPI system expanded while reducing the number
of available pumps. In the simulation with only one pump, the self-blocking effect
does not collapse even during a doubled simulation time. Nevertheless the core is
quenched by steam cooling at some point, but the mass of melt relocated to the lower
plenum has grown by 3 t.
After the four studies had been carried out, two interesting sensitivity questions have
been analyzed in order to account for uncertainties on the side of the simulation tool
ATHLET-CD. First, the BLOCKAGE input parameters were investigated, by changing
the parameters in two separate simulations by + 10 % and − 10 % respectively. The
resulting simulations differ strongly from the one conducted with the default BLOCK-
AGE parameters, and a trend was visible to better core cooling with higher BLOCKAGE
parameters, because then the resulting flow paths remain bigger. Blockages should
be investigated in more detail, because they play a decisive role in the quenching of a
degrade reactor core.
The other investigation focused on the impact of the usage of the AIDA module,
because without the AIDA module, no relocation of melt to the lower plenum can be
simulated, thus the melt is accumulated in the core area. The simulation not using the
AIDA module showed a high amount of blockades in the core area, making it difficult
to quench by water. Activation of the AIDA module leads to a relocation of those
materials blocking the flow channels to the lower plenum, thus simplifying the core
quenching but forming an unquenchable molten pool in the lower plenum.
Summarizing the results as extension of the guidelines for the operators in existing
German PWRs it can be said that any amount of water injected into the core will
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be better than none, but if a choice can be made, the HPI might be better suited to
quench an already melting core, because it leads to more stable reflooding conditions
due to its small pressure dependency in the low pressure regime thus creating smaller
loads on the structures of the primary system. Also, the quenching starts immediately,
because no self-blocking effect is created, opposing the reflooding using the LPI, which
is the usual measure currently.
Another suggestion derived from the simulation results is that it might be useful to
provide an MPI system as ECCS. Pumps with useful specifications are available on
most plant sides, e. g. as condensate feedwater pumps. It might also be useful to
equip fire-trucks on the plant site and in the vicinity of the NPP with pumps that can
withstand the pressure built-up of up to 4MPa.
The results obtained in this study can be used to improve the Severe Accidents Man-
agement Guidelines. Since the guidelines themselves are specific for each nuclear
power plant and classified, the results obtained here are difficult to be applied directly.
They should rather be seen as recommendations for authorities, as to where lay im-
provement potential for those SMAGs. Potential improvements have to be connected
with a future experimental and analytical program and further numerical simulations
with validated codes in order to evaluate the question, which measures have to be
taken to cool a partially degraded PWR core in a more detailed manner.
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Appendix
The appendices are referred to on the following pages:
• Appendix A1
Input data for the AIDA module on page 28
• Appendix A2
Input data for the GCSM signals used by the AIDA module on page 28
• Appendix A3
Input data for the ECORE module on page 40
• Appendix A4
GMCS input for the emergency cooling preparation signal (ECPS) on page 41
• Appendix A5
GCSM input for the reactor control systems observation values on page 43
• Appendix A6
Input data for the GCSM signals used for the reflooding simulation on page 55
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A1 Input data for the AIDA module
The following code is the complete user input for the lower plenum module AIDA. A
description of all the parameters can be found in the ATHLET-CD User’s Manual [27].
Figure A.1: Input for the AIDA module, part I
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Figure A.2: Input for the AIDA module, part II
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A2 Input data for the GCSM signals used by the AIDA
module
The following code shows the GCSM control signals used by the lower plenum module
AIDA. A description of the GCSM signals can be found in the ATHLET User’s Manual
[24].
Figure A.3: Input for the GCSM control signals used by the AIDA module
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A3 Input data for the ECORE module
The following code is the complete user input for the ECORE module including the
input for ROD1 (the innermost core ring). ROD2 to ROD6 are modeled with the same
values except for the core ring size and numbers of fuel and control rods modeled
in the core sections. These values can be found in table 3.1. A description of all the
parameters can be found in the ATHLET-CD User’s Manual [27].
Figure A.4: Input for the ECORE module, part I
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Figure A.5: Input for the ECORE module, part II
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Figure A.6: Input for the ECORE module, part III
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A4 GMCS input for the emergency cooling preparation
signal (ECPS)
Figure A.7: Input for the GCSM signals used for the simulation of the emergency cool-
ing preparation signal
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A5 GCSM input for the reactor control systems
observation values
Figure A.8: Input for the GCSM process signals used as observation values on which
the reactor control system is based
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A6 Input data for the GCSM signals used for the
reflooding simulation
The following code shows the GCSM control signals used for the reflooding simulation.
A description of the GCSM signals can be found in the ATHLET User’s Manual [24].
Figure A.9: Input for the GCSM signals used for the reflooding simulation, part I
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Figure A.10: Input for the GCSM signals used for the reflooding simulation, part II
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Figure A.11: Input for the GCSM signals used for the reflooding simulation, part III
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Figure A.12: Input for the GCSM signals used for the reflooding simulation, part IV
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Figure A.13: Input for the GCSM signals used for the reflooding simulation, part V
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Figure A.14: Input for the GCSM signals used for the reflooding simulation, part VI
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Figure A.15: Input for the GCSM signals used for the reflooding simulation, part VII
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